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Summary
Sustainable supply chain management deals with the design and operation of
profitable supply chains that also respect limitations on natural resources, do
no harm to the environment, and consider the social systems they operate in.
In academic research on sustainable supply chain management, as well as in
policy documents from e.g. the European Union, the concepts of circular econ-
omy and closed-loop supply chains have received significant attention. One of
the manifestations of these developments are industrial symbiosis networks.
These networks are a collaborative effort to more sustainable production op-
erations, and are characterized by a supply chain reconfiguration that uses
one company’s wastes or by-products as a raw material for another company,
avoiding waste disposal while also reducing material requirements. The re-
sulting networks of relationships contribute to regional sustainable develop-
ment efforts, and emphasize synergistic relations, community, and collabora-
tion.
This thesis takes an operations and supply chain management perspec-
tive on industrial symbiosis networks. More specifically, the thesis elaborates
on the collaborative and competitive characteristics of industrial symbiosis.
First, it discusses the supply chain integration and coordination challenges
that appear in industrial symbiosis, on both an organizational and operational
level. Secondly, the thesis discusses the organizational capabilities and re-
sources relevant for the competitiveness of industrial symbiosis networks on
three dimensions: the level of the firm, the network, and the business envi-
ronment. Finally, the thesis elaborates on supply chain resiliency based on a
formal model with multiple concurrent suppliers. The model includes fair-
ness considerations in different by-product allocation strategies, which turn
out to have different requirements and consequences for the organization and
facilitation of the collaborative efforts.
Overall, this thesis aims to ground industrial symbiosis in operations and
supply chain management theory. The thesis thereby provides a basis for
the improved organization and operation of industrial symbiosis networks,
and supports the development towards resource-efficient closed-loop mate-
rial flows.
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Resume´
Bæredygtighed i supply chain management handler om at udvikle og at styre
forsyningskæder som er ikke kun profitabelt, men ogsa˚ respekterer begræns-
ninger i ressourcer, ska˚ner miljøet, og respekterer den sociale sammenhæng
forsyningskæden opererer i. I supply chain management forskningen, og ogsa˚
i miljøpolitiske diskussioner i f.eks. Danmark eller Den Europæiske Union,
har begreberne cirkulær økonomi og lukkede kredsløber fa˚et betydelig op-
mærksomhed. Et af de mest kendte eksempler i denne udvikling er indu-
strielle symbiosenetværk, en slags industrielle kosystemer, hvor flere virk-
somheder samarbejder for at fa˚ en mere bæredygtig produktion. Symbiose-
netværk er baseret pa˚ en opsætning af forsyningskæder, hvor e´n virksom-
heds affaldsprodukter eller biprodukter bliver til en ressource for en anden
virksomhed. Pa˚ den ma˚de undga˚r virksomheder omkostninger ved bortskaf-
ning af affaldsprodukter og samtidig realiseres besparelser pa˚ ressourcesiden.
Samarbejdet i symbiosenetværk bidrager til en bæredygtig udvikling af lokal
omra˚det, og understøtter synergi, godt naboskab og samarbejde.
Denne afhandling beskæftiger sig med et supply chain management per-
spektiv pa˚ industrielle symbiosenetværk. Den uddyber de kollektive og kon-
kurrencedygtige karakteristika ved symbiosenetværk. Afhandlingen diskute-
rer udfordringer i forhold til integration og koordination af forsyningskæder i
symbiosenetværk, hvor ba˚de organisatoriske og operationelle aspekter bliver
behandlet. Til at uddybe konkurrencedygtighed ved symbiosenetværk, dis-
kuterer afhandlingen ogsa˚ de organisatoriske kapaciteter og ressourcer som
virksomheder bruger til at opna˚ konkurrencedygtigheden. Disse kapaciteter
og ressourcer bliver identificeret pa˚ tre niveauer: virksomhed, netværk, og er-
hvervsklima. Til sidst diskuterer afhandlingen supply chain resiliency baseret
pa˚ en model, som inkluderer flere samtidige leverandører af affaldsprodukter
eller biprodukter. Modellen fokuserer pa˚ at betragte retfærdigheden i forskel-
lige metoder til allokeringen af produkterne. Resultaterne viser, at de forskel-
lige metoder ogsa˚ fører til forskellige krav og konsekvenser med hensyn til
organisering og facilitering af samarbejdet.
Afhandlingens overordnede ma˚l er at at udvikle et fundament til indu-
strielle symbioser inden for supply chain management teori. Afhandlingen
konstruerer dermed et grundlag for bedre organisation og drift af industrielle
symbiosenetværk og hjælper virksomheder og andre interessenter til at øge
ressourceeffektiviteten og støtte dem i omstillingen til en cirkulær økonomi.
v
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Sustainability of economic development has been in the centre of interest of
political and business grounds since the bookOur Common Future, also known
as the Brundtland Report, was published in 1987. In this report, the World
Commission on Environment and Development defines sustainable develop-
ment as “development that meets the needs of the present without compro-
mising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (WCED
1987). Although the definition has been criticised for its all encompassing
scope, as a result the sustainability movement gained momentum.
Today, the European Union has a vision of “living well within the limits of
the planet” (EU 2013). However, Europe faces both persistent and emerging
challenges in the realization of this vision (EEA 2015). Production and con-
sumption in today’s industrial society depletes non-renewable resources and
generates waste at an unprecedented rate and on global scale. This not only
creates challenges for future generations, but already for the communities we
live in. It is now clear that to address concerns relating to the security of ac-
cess to natural resources and the wider environmental impacts of escalating
global resource use, a sustainable industrial society has to emphasise resource
efficiency through a closed-loop system of materials (EEA 2016).
1.1 Sustainable supply chain management
In general, a supply chain encompasses every effort involved in producing
and delivering a product from the supplier to the final customer. Furthermore,
supply chain management focuses on multiple customer-supplier dyads ulti-
7
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mately spanning from raw material extractors to the final customer (Harland
1996). The theory of supply chain management is grounded on a paradigm of
cooperative strategic management that emphasizes collaboration within a net-
work of interdependent relationships with the goal of deriving mutual bene-
fits (Chen and Paulraj 2004). The theory draws on the “relational view” of
inter-organizational competitive advantage (Dyer and Singh 1998) and typi-
cally considers the dyad or the network as the unit of analysis.
Sustainability concerns caused amovement towards triple bottom line per-
formancemeasures concerning the relationship of profit, people, and the planet
(Elkington 1998). The triple bottom line has been applied to supply chain
management resulting in challenges related to e.g. environmental impacts,
health and safety concerns, and employment issues (Kleindorfer et al. 2005).
Kleindorfer et al. argue that to find opportunities for obtaining competitive
advantage while also meeting environmental and social needs, supply chain
management needs strategies that re-evaluate material choices and pursue
closed-loop supply chains and safe disposal. Furthermore, companies need
to develop capabilities in operations and supply chain management for long-
term sustainability.
The fact that the supply chain causes emissions in and places a burden on
the natural environment has been long recognized (Bloemhof-Ruwaard et al.
1995). In general, the supply chain’s need for natural resources extracts non-
renewable and scarce resources from the planet. Furthermore, emissions and
wastes that are generated along the supply chain are transported and trans-
formed and result in water, air and soil pollution with damaging effects on
the environment. These concerns have been translated into an environmen-
tally responsible supply chain management.
However, sustainable development also entails corporate social respon-
sibility (Holme and Watts 1999). According to Holme and Watts, corporate
social responsibility is the continuing commitment by business to behave eth-
ically and contribute to economic development while improving the quality
of life of the workforce and their families as well as of the local community
and society at large. In general, supply chains employworkers to produce and
distribute products to consumers. Furthermore, people’s health and safety are
affected by these products and the environmental impact that supply chains
generate. Consequently, sustainable supply chain management must also ex-
tend to the people domain (Tang and Zhou 2012).
In general, improving the sustainability of supply chain operations is af-
fected by policy rooted in natural and social sciences (Linton et al. 2007).
However, research and practice in supply chain management can also af-
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fect policy and science by presenting alternative scenarios for the develop-
ment of sustainable supply chains. Sustainability stretches the concept of
supply chain management including the entire production system and post-
production stewardship (Linton et al. 2007). Furthermore, sustainable sup-
ply chain management must also integrate organizational, governmental, and
community stakeholder perspectives into the business perspectives (Seuring
and Mu¨ller 2008). Most importantly, however, research and practice has to
overcome making unsustainable supply chains less unsustainable. In other
words, truly sustainable supply chains must not cause environmental or so-
cial harm (Pagell and Shevchenko 2014).
In research on sustainable supply chainmanagement, the concept of closed-
loop supply chains has received significant attention. Here, the term closed-
loop supply chain refers to system in which materials and products are in
circulation as a opposed to a linear extraction, production, consumption, dis-
posal system. Traditionally, closed-loop supply chains take care of product
recovery after consumer use (Fleischmann et al. 2000). Closed-loop supply
chain management considers the product life-cycle including its design and
recovery in order to maximize value creation (Guide and van Wassenhove
2006). The closed-loop supply chain encompasses a forward channel and a
reverse channel, which includes the collection of end-of-life products and re-
cycling activities. There is a significant amount of research on various aspects
of closed-loop supply chains and reverse logistics, as well as many directions
for future research (Govindan et al. 2015). However, supply chains also gen-
erate undesired outputs upstream. Managing manufacturing by-products are
a distinct part of sustainable supply chain management apart from product
recovery (Linton et al. 2007).
Sustainable supply chain management must be explicitly extended to in-
clude undesired outputs generated along the supply chain, to consider the
entire lifecycle of products, and to optimize a product from a total costs stand-
point (Linton et al. 2007). Total costs must include the effects of resource de-
pletion and the generation of undesired outputs that are neither captured nor
used. According to Linton et al. (2007), the challenges require management
to change existing practices and create new production and management sys-
tems. In other words, management has to reconceptualize what the supply
chain does from a business point of view, who is involved in the supply chain,
and how the performance of this supply chain is measured (Pagell and Wu
2009).
With respect to the loop-closing effort of supply chain management, in-
dustrial ecology has been pointed out as a source of useful insights on the
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efficient and productive use of by-products and wastes generated along the
supply chain (Kleindorfer et al. 2005, Linton et al. 2007). Furthermore, Linton
and his colleagues refer to the concept of industrial ecosystems as a manufac-
turing and supply chain strategy.
1.2 Industrial ecosystems and industrial symbiosis
The Brundtland Report on sustainable development gave momentum to new
ideas concerning challenges around sustainability. Although there had been
earlier attempts to realise closed-loop material flows, the idea become popu-
lar thanks to an article published in 1989 by Robert Frosch and Nicholas Gal-
lopoulos in the magazine Scientific American in a special issue on “Managing
Planet Earth”. The authors introduced the concept of industrial ecosystems to
a large audience, which was a significant development for the emerging field
of industrial ecology (Erkman 1997).
Frosch and Gallopoulos (1989) conceptualised an ideal industrial ecosys-
tem where the consumption of materials and energy is optimised, waste gen-
eration is minimized and the undesired outputs of one production or con-
sumption process serve as the raw material input for another process. They
argued that processes are required to minimize the generation of unrecyclable
wastes as well as minimize the consumption of scarce material and energy re-
sources. Furthermore, they pointed out that individual production processes
cannot be considered in isolation; linking inputs and outputs of individual
processes is crucial for building a closed system.
In general, industrial ecology offers a design and policy framework for in-
dustrial ecosystems (Ehrenfeld 1997). According to Ehrenfeld design encom-
passes activities to establish new forms of technology, organizational (institu-
tional) structures, human competences and regulations that help to achieve
the desired changes. Furthermore, he emphasizes that the design process
must be bottom-up, participatory, rooted in practical experience, and arising
from the understanding of those most centrally involved. The design princi-
ples include reducing energy consumption while emphasising renewable en-
ergy sources, keeping substances that upset natural processes out of the envi-
ronment, dematerialising industrial output1, and creating loop-closing indus-
trial ecosystems with circular material flows.
Industrial ecology recognises the limits of cleaner production and pol-
lution prevention arguing that most production and consumption processes
1Dematerialisation essentially aims to reduce material consumption of products. It led to
trends, for example in decreasing product weight and product services.
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necessarily generate undesired outputs, such as wastes and by-products (Erk-
man 1997). Given these practical limits, and to achieve a more efficient use of
resources, the loop-closing aspect of industrial ecology suggests an integrated
view on production processes within a larger system (Ehrenfeld 1997). The
integrated and systematic view on interrelated production and consumption
processes draws boundaries around industrial ecosystems. These boundaries
are either geographical (e.g. within a region or industrial district) or based on
the product/material chain (Boons and Baas 1997).
In general, loop-closing efforts result in recycling structures. Schwarz and
Steininger (1997) describe recycling structures by system elements (compa-
nies) and “waste relationships” that connect two or more elements by waste
flows and information flows. Furthermore, they argue that quantitative changes
in the surrounding system (e.g. increase in waste disposal fees, development
of environmental scarcities) may trigger a network level organization of sys-
tem elements with common waste-related goals. The resulting recycling net-
work is characterised by long-term collaboration between companies empha-
sising stable relationships and strategic information exchange. However, the
size of the recycling network is limited by organizational, informational, eco-
nomic, regulatory and technical constraints that typically allow development
within geographical boundaries.
The first recycling network in history to be uncovered by researchers is
the Kalundborg Industrial Symbiosis in the northern part of Sjælland in Den-
mark (Ehrenfeld and Gertler 1997). In general, the term “symbiosis” is used to
describe the mutual aspect of relationships that provides collective economic
benefits to the participants2. In Kalundborg, industrial symbiosis involves
eight public and private companies that buy and sell wastes and by-products,
and has been emphasizing collaboration for more than fifty years (Symbiosis
Institute 2016). Figure 1.1 depicts the supply network. The resulting advan-
tages for the whole region lie in the companies’ economic benefits, the indirect
contribution to regional development, and in the reduction of the total emis-
sion and disposal released by the system (Jacobsen and Anderberg 2004).
Since it was first coined, the term “industrial symbiosis” has become estab-
lished within the field of industrial ecology and also within the business com-
munity and with policy makers. In the last two decades, the term was used
to describe recycling activities in regional districts and eco-industrial parks
(for a compilation of projects worldwide see Massard et al. (2012)), as well
as large scale recycling initiatives, such as the National and Global Industrial
2Symbiosis is a biological metaphor referring to a close sustained living together of two species
or kinds of organisms.
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Figure 1.1: The industrial symbiosis in Kalundborg, Denmark (Symbiosis In-
stitute 2016).
Symbiosis Programme (International Synergies 2016). Industrial symbiosis is
identified as a key feature of industrial ecosystems. Furthermore, according
to the European Environmental Agency, industrial symbiosis is a key enabling
factor for resource efficiency (EEA 2016).
By definition, industrial symbiosis engages traditionally separate indus-
tries in a collective approach to competitive advantage involving physical ex-
change of materials, energy, water, and/or by-products (Chertow 2000). Con-
sequently, virgin raw materials are substituted by undesired production out-
puts. However, the development of industrial symbiosis is different from
common market activities. Researchers argue that industrial symbiosis re-
quires geographical proximity, institutionalization of shared values, regula-
tory context, and high information flows (Ehrenfeld andGertler 1997, Schwarz
and Steininger 1997). Furthermore, industrial symbiosis networks develop
gradually through an evolutionary process. In order to progress from the
stage of waste relationships, participants must be aware of their positive en-
vironmental externalities and institutionalize industrial symbiosis , including
the embeddedness of network actors, the role of locational factors, and the
ways in which social capital comes into play (Chertow and Ehrenfeld 2012).
During its evolution, industrial symbiosis engages diverse organizations in
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a network to share and create knowledge fostering eco-innovation and long-
term cultural change (Lombardi and Laybourn 2012)
1.3 Managing industrial symbiosis networks
The managerial implications of industrial ecology were first emphasised in
1993 by the British consultant Hardin Tibbs (Erkman 1997). According to
Tibbs, the framework of industrial ecology is uniquely able to provide the co-
ordinating vision for corporate environmental strategy (Tibbs 1993). Further-
more, industrial ecology permits an integrated technological and managerial
interpretation, including business application and technological opportunity
domains. However, From a business point of view, the challenge for industrial
ecology is to offer an agenda that allows progress to be measured, enhanced
business performance, and applicability by any industry, permitting alliances
and cooperation among companies and between industries.
Industrial symbiosis is a collaborative business approach to increase re-
source efficiency (EEA 2016). Organizations in industrial symbiosis networks
translate the principles of industrial ecology into practical business applica-
tions. They emphasize loop-closing efforts resulting in synergistic inter-orga-
nizational relationships. Most importantly, the resulting mutual cost reduc-
tion, increased revenues, and competitive advantages cause synergies to be
attractive business opportunities.
In general, the performance of an industrial symbiosis network can be
benchmarked against an industrial system that operates without symbiosis
(van Berkel 2010). The benefits can then be measured by the substitution of
virgin material intake and the avoidance of waste disposal. Furthermore, the
conversion of undesired outputs may be positive for technological innova-
tion and employment even though it requires facilities, staff, and energy. Ide-
ally, industrial symbiosis also improves energy efficiency and increases the
amount of process outputs that have market value (Lowe 1997). Furthermore,
industrial symbiosis not only reduces undesired production outputs, but the
tight network of inter-organizational relationships fosters social equity and
economic prosperity. In other words, industrial symbiosis is aligned with the
triple bottom line of sustainability.
Industrial symbiosis networks have however also been criticised for the
potential environmental risks they entail. Lowe (1997) argues that focusing
on industrial symbiosis could lock in continued reliance on unsustainable
technologies and toxic materials, thereby overlooking other industrial ecol-
ogy principles. The short-term benefits in industrial symbiosis networks can
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delay innovation in terms of clean technologies. In other words, resource effi-
ciency improvements achieved with synergies have to be considered within a
larger context of effective environmental solutions that look into the future.
Companies in industrial symbiosis networks must have an environmen-
tally proactive strategic stance combining life-cycle thinking and a long-term
view, and welcome cooperation and alliances with other organizations (Tibbs
1993). Achieving industrial ecology objectives requires the management of
relations between the organizations involved (Boons and Baas 1997). With
respect to the evolutionary aspect of industrial symbiosis networks the aim
of management is to initiate synergistic relations and to support their pro-
gression towards an integrated network pursuing the principles of industrial
ecology. Based on empirical evidence, Chertow and Ehrenfeld (2012) argue
that industrial symbiosis networks that persist move into the direction of en-
vironmental sustainability. Furthermore, the key factors in their development
include a broader view of economic analysis that includes local and regional
variables, a bottom-up cooperation model across companies, and revealed
and quantified environmental benefits.
In general, there are two types of management approaches in relation to
industrial symbiosis networks. Industrial symbiosis is often a self-organizing
system, in which individual companies spontaneously start cooperation and
build alliance partnerships (Chertow and Ehrenfeld 2012). Furthermore, there
can also be the involvement of a support system – an organizational unit –
that facilitates the development of industrial symbiosis networks (Lowe 1997).
However, development models that have a top-down approach with a central
plan for cooperation have proven to be less successful, particularly in Europe
and North America (Heeres et al. 2004, Gibbs and Deutz 2007). Chertow and
Ehrenfeld (2012) explain their failure with lack of embeddedness and institu-
tionalization that would foster and disperse the norms of cooperation inherent
to industrial symbiosis.
The spontaneous organization of industrial networks draws on the social
network of companies (Ashton 2008). Ashton finds that trust among man-
agers and position in the social hierarchy is correlated with industrial symbio-
sis. Furthermore, there is consensus about that institutionalization of indus-
trial symbiosis may only manifest if there is a fundamental sense of commu-
nity among businesses (Ehrenfeld 1997, Ashton 2008, Chertow and Ehrenfeld
2012). Conversely, a lack of such community and cohesion hinders the evo-
lution of industrial symbiosis networks because there is no social network on
which it can be built (Boons and Baas 1997).
While industrial symbiosis networks must be largely self-organizing, there
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is a significant role for an organizing team and an organizational unit (Ehren-
feld 1997, Chertow and Ehrenfeld 2012). According to Ehrenfeld the basic
responsibility of an organizing team is to support companies in exploring fea-
sible synergistic opportunities with other companies with guidance and in-
formation. Furthermore, a broker (coordinator) may take the responsibility
for maintaining the cohesion of a broader network as well as for sales and
marketing of wastes and by-products. The broker would help companies to
perceive their common opportunities and explore opportunities for increas-
ing effectiveness of the whole network (Ehrenfeld 1997). The National Indus-
trial Symbiosis Programme in the United Kingdom is for example facilitated
by a group of experts that aim to engage companies in spontaneous collabo-
ration, and also try to increase the effectiveness of existing well-performing
symbioses (Paquin and Howard-Grenville 2012).
The key role of the organizational unit is to institutionalize industrial sym-
biosis (Chertow and Ehrenfeld 2012). In general, the organizational unit pro-
vides a platform where companies can meet each other, share information
about their undesired production outputs, and conceptualize ideas concern-
ing synergies. Furthermore, the organizational unit offers a platform where
companies and authorities can interact. Consequently, companies become in-
formed about regulations concerning waste reuse and can in turn influence
regulatory policy. The Symbiosis Institute is the organizational unit of the in-
dustrial symbiosis in Kalundborg. The Symbiosis Institute evolved alongwith
the network and is now partially responsible for the development of the net-
work: its core aim is to align industrial cooperation and regional sustainable
development efforts, involving both competitive industry and a responsible
and efficient use of natural resources (Jacobsen and Anderberg 2004).
In industrial symbiosis networks, organizational relations manifest syn-
ergistic transactions (by-product synergies), involving by-product sellers and
buyers (Lowe 1997). Transaction costs typically include partner search costs,
the cost of negotiating the terms of the exchange, and the cost of enforcing
the resulting contracts (Chertow and Ehrenfeld 2012). Furthermore, industrial
symbiosis creates inter-dependency between the partners (Boons and Baas
1997). This inter-dependency results from the fact that organizations do not
control all the resources necessary for their activities. In fact, in synergistic
transactions, supply and demand of by-products are a function of indepen-
dent market mechanisms. However, inter-dependency in industrial symbio-
sis is managed in a cooperative manner, manifesting strategic alliances (Boons
and Baas 1997). Consequently, supply chain management is relevant in indus-
trial symbiosis networks.
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Figure 1.2: Illustration of material flows in industrial symbiosis networks
within geographical boundaries
However, industrial symbiosis networks are different from traditional sup-
ply chains in several aspects (Bansal and McKnight 2009). First, the architec-
ture of the two supply systems is different. According to Bansal andMcKnight
(2009), while the emphasis of traditional supply chain management is waste
reduction within a company, the emphasis of industrial symbiosis is waste re-
duction over an entire system of companies. They point out that, in addition
to forward and reverse flows, in industrial symbiosis networks, wastes and
by-products create a “sideways” flow of products, as illustrated in Figure 1.2.
In other words, industrial symbiosis manifests across supply chains. Further-
more, from a business point of view, synergistic relationships take advantage
of idiosyncratic fit between firms based on by-product supply and demand
within geographical boundaries.
Second, a key difference between industrial symbiosis and traditional sup-
ply chains is reflected in the coordination mechanisms (Bansal and McKnight
2009). Symbiotic partners typically have “short mental distance” and a shared
vision to emphasize local environmental and social sustainability (Jacobsen
and Anderberg 2004). In general, these conditions allows the translation of
industrial ecology principles into business applications (Tibbs 1993). Further-
more, communication and personal relationships are important parts of net-
work emergence and formulating the sustainability vision. In addition, trust is
an important coordinationmechanism in determining the companies’ engage-
ment with the industrial symbiosis network (Lombardi and Laybourn 2012).
In industrial symbiosis, companies need to trust their partners to meet quality
and quantity expectations in relation to the exchanged by-products (Bansal
and McKnight 2009).
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In general, the supply and demand of by-products and waste creates chal-
lenges and risks for industrial symbiosis (Lowe 1997). Stability of by-product
supply is considered as the “Achilles heel” of industrial symbiosis (Coˆte´ and
Smolenaars 1997). Similarly, demand security is also an important factor (Ja-
cobsen and Anderberg 2004). However, the quantity of by-products (both
supply and demand) is determined by the demand for the core products,
and because production operations are normally driven by the core product,
the quality of by-products can be compromised (Bansal and McKnight 2009).
Consequently, synergistic transactions carry liability. There is a risk of losing
a critical supply or market if a plant closes down or changes its product mix
(Lowe 1997). In addition, an uneven quality of by-products could damage the
equipment or the quality of products. To coordinate cooperation, companies
typically rely on standard mechanisms like long-term agreements, bilateral
contracts, and joint-ventures (Jacobsen 2006).
If industrial symbiosis creates toomuch inter-dependency among the com-
panies, the failure of one or few critical links could damage the performance
of the whole network (Lowe 1997). This kind of fragility of industrial sym-
biosis networks has been pointed out by others as well (e.g. Coˆte´ and Smole-
naars 1997, Zhu and Coˆte´ 2004, Bansal and McKnight 2009). Consequently,
Lowe (1997) argues that maintaining alternative suppliers and customers cre-
ates redundancy and a broader market, which will give greater resilience to
the pattern of trades. Furthermore, increasing diversity in a by-product port-
folio helps to manage temporary production or marketing problems: losses
from a by-product line can be compensated by profits of other lines (Zhu and
Coˆte´ 2004). However, the emerging challenge with greater resilience, which
comes from increased redundancy and/or diversity, is to ensure consensus
among participants regarding mutual benefits (Lowe 1997).
1.4 Research gaps
Industrial symbiosis has been studied for about two decades. The related
research domain is growing in breadth and is increasing the pace of inte-
gration between natural and social sciences (Lombardi et al. 2012). Analyz-
ing the trend in industrial symbiosis research, Yu et al. (2013) concluded that
mainstream research can be divided into five disciplines: (i) wastewater treat-
ment and management, (ii) energy efficiency, (iii) solid waste management,
(iv) self-organization of industrial symbiosis networks, and (v) policy mak-
ing and evaluation for industrial symbiosis and eco-industrial park projects.
Furthermore, their analysis identified that industrial symbiosis is loosely and
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indirectly connected with research areas such as supply chain management.
Indeed, the idea of industrial ecosystems presented by Frosch and Gal-
lopoulos (1989) penetrated to the discipline of sustainable supply chain man-
agement (Linton et al. 2007). However, research within the supply chain man-
agement discipline concerning industrial symbiosis has not been proliferated
yet. Nevertheless, it has been found that sustainable (green) supply chain
management takes advantage of industrial symbiosis, and it has been sug-
gested that supply chain integration should begin to form networks instead
of following the path of a single product (Zhu and Coˆte´ 2004). Furthermore,
in comparison with traditional supply chains, industrial symbiosis networks
have complex coordination mechanisms combining market mechanisms with
community relationships, trust, and a shared sustainability vision (Bansal and
McKnight 2009).
Currently, the domain of industrial symbiosis constitutes a niche within
supply chain management research. However, as far as policy is concerned,
industrial symbiosis is declared as a central tool in closing resource loops (EC
2015, EEA 2016). Clearly, management has a pivotal role in translating indus-
trial symbiosis into practical business application (Tibbs 1993, Erkman 1997).
Furthermore, supply chain management has the scope that comprehends the
collaborative, inter-organizational aspects of industrial symbiosis networks.
Consequently, there is an opportunity for supply chain management research
to make important contributions in relation to industrial symbiosis.
In general, there are several facets of the industrial symbiosis phenomenon
where supply chain management can contribute. First, the collaborative fea-
ture of industrial symbiosis is particularly interesting. Collaboration in indus-
trial symbiosis networks emphasizes relations across supply chains instead of
along the supply chain, and it entails community and business relationships
in geographical proximity instead of buying and selling globally. This collab-
orative effort, however, needs to overcome challenges in order to successfully
translate industrial symbiosis into a business application that is in line with
the triple bottom line considerations. Supply chain management theory can
be used to elaborate on the relevant aspects of collaboration to identify chal-
lenges inmanaging industrial symbiosis networks in particular. Filling this re-
search gap will be beneficial in understanding the sustainability performance
of industrial symbiosis networks, and provide directions to increase their fea-
sibility and resource efficiency. This research gap translates into the following
research questions (RQ):
RQ1a — How do companies in industrial symbiosis pursue the triple
bottom line of sustainability?
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RQ1b — What are the supply chain collaboration challenges that affect
the sustainability performance of industrial symbiosis networks?
Second, the competitiveness feature of industrial symbiosis is also inter-
esting. In fact, collective competitive advantage is what makes synergistic
opportunities attractive for companies (Chertow 2000). From a managerial
point of view, competitive advantage requires an idiosyncratic value creation
strategy that is not simultaneously being implemented by other competitors
(Barney 1991). It is widely accepted that industrial symbiosis increases nat-
ural resource productivity (Porter and van der Linde 1995, Esty and Porter
1998). Furthermore, competitiveness includes reduced costs through innova-
tive product and process changes, increasing revenue, diversifying business,
and managerial risk (Lombardi and Laybourn 2012). However, there is a re-
search gap regarding the idiosyncratic features of industrial symbiosis. Sup-
ply chain management theory and strategic management theory can be used
to identify the key components of collective competitive advantage in indus-
trial symbiosis. Filling this gap has important practical implications regarding
implementing industrial symbiosis as part of the loop-closing strategy. Fur-
thermore, filling this gap will also contribute to supply chain management
theory because it comprehends the inter-organizational competitive features
of industrial symbiosis networks. The following questions are put forward:
RQ2a — What are the key capabilities and resources that firms partici-
pating in industrial symbiosis rely on?
RQ2b—How is competitive advantage in industrial symbiosis networks
obtained based on these capabilities and resources?
Finally, the combination of the collaborative and competitiveness features
also provides opportunities for research. In particular, the management of
trade-offs when economic profitability is combined with an extended stake-
holder view is interesting. In fact, mutually beneficial relations are one of the
hallmarks of industrial symbiosis (Chertow 2000). Managing industrial sym-
biosis networks may involve multiple, concurrent suppliers and/or buyers
to increase supply chain resilience while ensuring collective benefits (Lowe
1997). However, these benefits have to be allocated to often non-equally per-
forming participants. Providing a fair distribution of benefits implies an eco-
nomic trade-off because it can imply a sub-optimal allocation of resources.
Consequently, it is important to quantify the “price of fairness” in industrial
symbiosis networks that comes with multiple, concurrent by-product suppli-
ers or buyers. In general, there is a research gap regarding the notion of fair-
ness in relation to industrial symbiosis. Filling this gap requires the develop-
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ment of a fairness measure and the proposition of fair allocation strategies in
industrial symbiosis networks. Furthermore, elaborating on the idea of fair-
ness in this context also contributes to the supply chain management litera-
ture. The following research questions are proposed:
RQ3a — How can the price of fairness be measured in industrial sym-
biosis networks?
RQ3b — How do different fairness approaches influence collaboration
in industrial symbiosis networks?
1.5 Thesis outline
This thesis approaches industrial symbiosis from a supply chain management
aspect. The purpose is to contribute to research on sustainable supply chain
management by grounding industrial symbiosis networks in management
theory. Furthermore, the aim is to offer a common ground for business and
action being proposed by policy concerned with resource efficient closed-loop
material flows. To do so, the thesis elaborates on the collaborative and com-
petitiveness features of industrial symbiosis networks.
The thesis includes three main chapters that each address one of the iden-
tified research gaps and corresponding research questions. Note that the indi-
vidual chapters are based on manuscripts of papers to be submitted for pub-
lications, and therefore might cause some minor overlap in introductory con-
tent to make sure the papers are self-sufficient.
In Chapter 2, a theoretical framework is built and used to discuss how
industrial symbiosis pursues sustainability and to identify the main collab-
oration challenges and performance impacts. The analysis is supported by
selected published case studies of industrial symbiosis networks. The chap-
ter identifies organizational and operational challenges for collaboration in
the context of IS networks, related to integration and coordination of supply
chain activities.
In Chapter 3, the competitive advantage attributed to industrial symbiosis
is grounded in the resource-based theory, which is a widely accepted theory
of competitiveness. Here again, the analysis is supported by selected pub-
lished case studies. The chapter identifies the key capabilities and resources
that managers leverage in industrial symbiosis networks. Furthermore, the
chapter elaborates on how competitive advantage can be obtained using these
capabilities and resources during the initiation and progression of industrial
symbiosis networks.
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In Chapter 4, the notion of fairness is introduced to industrial symbiosis.
A mathematical model of an industrial symbiosis network with multiple, con-
current suppliers is developed to measure the economic efficiency of resource
allocation. Furthermore, fair resource allocation strategies are proposed and
compared based on their resulting efficiency trade-offs. The findings show
that the “price of fairness” of the allocation strategies is different and depends
on the general supply-demand of by-products. Furthermore, the chapter elab-
orates on how the allocation strategies support, collaborative, individualistic
or even altruistic behaviour in industrial symbiosis networks.
Finally, in Chapter 5 the thesis contains a conclusions chapter that summa-
rizes the findings and outlines future research opportunities on supply chain
management in industrial symbiosis networks.

CHAPTER 2
Collaborative effort for sustainability
This chapter is based on a manuscript to be submitted for publication under the title
“Supply chain collaboration in industrial symbiosis networks”. The manuscript is co-
authored by Ga´bor Herczeg, Renzo Akkerman and Michael Zwicky Hauschild.
Abstract
One of the central strategies supporting the development of a circular
economy, industrial symbiosis, is a form of collaborative supply chain
management aiming to make industry more environmentally sustainable
and achieve collective benefits based on utilization of waste, by-products,
and excess utilities between economically independent industries. This
paper investigates industrial symbiosis from a supply chain collaboration
perspective. A theoretical framework is built and used to discuss how in-
dustrial symbiosis pursues sustainability and to identify the main collabo-
ration challenges and performance impacts. The analysis is supported by
selected published cases. The paper identifies organizational and opera-
tional challenges for collaboration in the context of industrial symbiosis
networks, related to integration and coordination of supply chain activi-
ties. As industrial symbiosis has only received little attention in the opera-
tions and supply chain management community, the identified challenges
directly lead to future research directions for this community. The analysis
in this paper provides directions to increase the feasibility and resource ef-
ficiency of industrial symbiosis networks and can hence be used by stake-
holders involved in these networks. industrial symbiosis is a central ele-
ment in the development of circular economy and is therefore increasingly
used in efforts to strengthen industry’s resource efficiency. The result-
ing collaborative supply chains have however received limited attention.
This paper aims to provide a supply chain collaboration perspective and
thereby contribute to an increased and more systematic understanding of
industrial symbiosis.
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2.1 Introduction
Industrial symbiosis is a concept based on the idea of industrial ecosystems,
establishing symbiotic relationships between traditionally different and eco-
nomically independent industries, typically in a relatively close geographi-
cal proximity (Chertow 2000). An industrial ecosystem refers to the idea of
reusing waste from one industrial process in another industrial process. In
such industrial ecosystems, the consumption of materials and energy is op-
timized, and by-products from one industry serve as raw materials for other
industries, reducing the disposal of waste and loss of resources (Frosch and
Gallopoulos 1989).
Building on the obvious economic benefits of sharing waste streams and
by-products, industrial symbiosis aims to improve environmental performance
and social responsibility (Mirata 2004, Bansal and McKnight 2009). Econom-
ically, participating companies benefit by gaining access to cheaper sourcing
and/or by avoiding disposal costs. Environmentally, the benefits are reduced
natural resource consumption and waste disposal and reduction of emissions
to air, water and soil from the production of the saved raw materials (e.g.
Schwarz and Steininger 1997, Chertow and Lombardi 2005, Jacobsen 2006). Fi-
nally, from a social perspective, participating in industrial symbiosis empha-
sizes the local community, working cooperatively with other industries and
governmental bodies to contribute to regional economic development (Baas
and Boons 2004)). As such, the ideas behind industrial symbiosis extend into
all three dimensions of sustainability, also known as the triple bottom line,
covering profit, planet and people (Kleindorfer et al. 2005, Tang and Zhou
2012). In its Action Plan for Circular Economy from 2015, the European Com-
mission targets a more sustainable and resource efficient economy in Europe
and identifies the need to promote industrial symbiosis and announces re-
vised European regulation of waste in order to “to clarify rules on by-products
to facilitate industrial symbiosis and help create a level-playing field across the
EU” (EC 2015).
From an operations and supply chain management perspective, industrial
symbiosis introduces new supplier-buyer relationships and forms a collabora-
tive supply chain network between previously unrelated companies (Bansal
and McKnight 2009, Miemczyk et al. 2012). The development of industrial
symbiosis therefore requires some degree of shared strategic visions and col-
lective decision-making, necessitating mutual recognition, trust and informa-
tion sharing, and often some sort of central organization (Lowe 1997, Baas
and Boons 2004, Chertow 2007). Also, newly introduced inter-dependencies
often imply technical challenges relating to the quantity and quality of indus-
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trial waste flows (Bansal and McKnight 2009). Furthermore, the success of
industrial symbiosis networks can be undermined by the lack of economic
incentives and by technological developments that change the balance in the
industrial ecosystem (Mirata 2004).
Even though examples of industrial symbiosis networks are plentiful, and
seem to contain numerous operations and supply chain management chal-
lenges, the industrial symbiosis phenomenon has not received much atten-
tion in the operations and supply chain management literature, even though
Kleindorfer et al. (2005) recognized the importance of building bridges be-
tween sustainable operations management and industrial ecology. This paper
postulates that an improved understanding of the supply chain collaboration
challenges in industrial symbiosis networks will (i) be highly beneficial in un-
derstanding the sustainability performance of industrial symbiosis networks,
(ii) provide directions to increase the feasibility and resource efficiency of in-
dustrial symbiosis networks, and (iii) provide research directions for supply
chain management researchers interested in socially and environmentally re-
sponsible operations.
To achieve this goal, this paper contributes to the literature in several ways.
First, the paper develops a theoretical framework that links industrial sym-
biosis to sustainable operations management and supply network collabora-
tion. Secondly, the paper analyzes the industrial symbiosis phenomenon as
a practice of sustainable operations management, discussing its stakeholders,
drivers, and performance. Here, selected industrial symbiosis cases are used
to demonstrate the arguments. Finally, the paper identifies organizational and
operational challenges with respect to supply chain collaboration.
2.2 Related literature and theoretical framework
There are several streams of literature related to the discussion in this paper.
First of all, the industrial ecology literature in which the concept of industrial
symbiosis originated. Major relevant contributions will be cited throughout
this paper. In addition, as industrial symbiosis represents collaborative efforts
to increase sustainability, two streams of research within operations and sup-
ply chain management are relevant: sustainable operations management and
supply network collaboration. In the following, a theoretical framework is
developed based on these two streams.
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2.2.1 Sustainable operations management
Following Kleindorfer et al. (2005), sustainable operationsmanagement can be
understood as a collection of practices that integrate a company’s profit and
efficiency related objectives with broader (social) considerations of internal
and external stakeholders and the impact on the natural environment. This
does not necessarily cover sustainability in the literal sense of the word, only
the fact that the management of production operations also considers environ-
mental and social concerns. Ideally, this eventually leads to increased overall
sustainability of the production operations.
Many stakeholders play a role in sustainable operationsmanagement, some
more focused on environmental performance, others more focused on social
performance (Meixell and Luoma 2016). On the one hand, organizational
stakeholders include the supply network itself: upstream and downstream
business partners, consumers, and employees (Linton et al. 2007). On the
other hand, stakeholders that are external to the supply chain include gov-
ernmental stakeholders, such as governments and trade associations, as well
as community stakeholders, such as environmental organizations and peo-
ple that live in geographical proximity of the industrial symbiosis network
(Henriques and Sadorsky 1999). In general, these different stakeholders lead
to pressure and incentives towards sustainability (Seuring and Mu¨ller 2008).
This paper builds on the generally accepted view on sustainability accord-
ing to which incentives and drivers behind sustainability boil down to profit-,
planet-, and people-related issues and performance expectations (i.e. the triple
bottom line) that influence a company’s operations strategy (e.g. Kleindorfer
et al. 2005, Linton et al. 2007, Carter and Rogers 2008, Diabat and Govindan
2011, Tang and Zhou 2012)
2.2.2 Supply network collaboration
Companies form a collaborative network to emphasize cooperation by for
example working towards mutual goals, developing processes or products
jointly, sharing the cost of investments, mitigating risk, sharing information
(Kumar and van Dissel 1996, de Leeuw and Fransoo 2009).
In terms of collaborative effort, this paper distinguishes between organiza-
tional and operational aspects that relate to the development and organization
of relationships and to the functioning of material exchanges, respectively. In
addition, this paper distinguishes between supply chain integration and coor-
dination as collaborative practices. In general, integration relates to strategic
developments and to the flow of goods including informational and delivery
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Figure 2.1: Overview of organizational and operational aspects of coordina-
tion and integration in collaborative supply networks.
aspects (Frohlich andWestbrook 2001, Vachon and Klassen 2007), whereas co-
ordination relates to the management of the resulting dependencies between
different supply chain entities emphasizing their joint decision-making and
actions towardsmutually defined objectives (Arshinder and Deshmukh 2008).
In short, integration builds links between companies, whereas coordination
aims to enable partners to work together effectively and efficiently. Figure
2.1 summarizes the main concepts identified with regards to supply network
collaboration.
From an organizational perspective, strategic integration defines inter-de-
pendencies in a supply network. Integration usually entails a communication
setting to transfer and integrate knowledge and expertise, and often results in
particular collaborative projects such as infrastructural development, product
design, or process design (Vachon andKlassen 2007). In a collaborative supply
network, knowledge and experience sharing contributes to the development
of a mutual understanding of circumstances that affect companies, and help
to develop core capabilities to address common challenges. The coordination
of this “collective learning” entails analyzing circumstances and synthesizing
improvements, and also engaging key stakeholders in collaboration (Simatu-
pang et al. 2002). Furthermore, to make collaboration sustainable, companies
have to coordinate the distribution of risks and benefits (Kumar and van Dis-
sel 1996). In order to align incentives, companies in collaboration share ob-
jectives, make joint decisions, and often rely on each other’s trustworthiness
(Hoyt and Huq 2000, de Leeuw and Fransoo 2009).
From an operational perspective, integration defines a production and de-
livery system. Consequently, logistical integration is characterized by exchang-
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ing explicit information between companies, such as production plans and
inventory levels, and implies better visibility of each other’s tactical plans
(Frohlich and Westbrook 2001, Vachon and Klassen 2007). Typically, logisti-
cal integration requires an information system that collects, stores, and works
with operational data. The coordination of logistics (i.e. logistical synchro-
nization) entails a mediation function that aims to match products with cus-
tomer demand while lowering costs and minimizing uncertainties (Simatu-
pang et al. 2002). Furthermore, to coordinate the terms of production and
delivery, suppliers and customers typically make contracts and agreements
(Jagdev and Thoben 2001).
Although collaboration emphasizes joint efforts and collective benefits,
companies do not always share these equally, potentially leading to conflicts.
Moreover, companies don’t necessarily depend on each other to the same
extent, leading to asymmetries in the relationship. As a result of low bene-
fits and/or high risks, companies may not participate or exit the supply net-
work. The increasing importance of sustainable supply chains makes it in-
creasingly challenging to ignore collaboration across industries (Spekman and
Davis 2016).
2.2.3 Theoretical framework
Figure 2.3 gives an overview of the main concepts from the previous sections,
and thereby presents the theoretical framework this paper will use to analyze
the industrial symbiosis phenomenon from an operations and supply chain
management perspective. The framework considers stakeholders as well as
collaborative supply network practices with the goal of improving sustain-
ability performance within a geographical region. In the following, the paper
first discusses the different stakeholders, and how their drivers, expectations,
and management practices target the triple bottom line of sustainability. Sub-
sequently, the paper focuses on the collaborative efforts in industrial symbio-
sis and analyzes operational and organizational aspects based on integration
and coordination.
2.3 Industrial symbiosis – stakeholders, drivers, and
performance
In the literature, industrial symbiosis is also referred to as industrial recycling
networks, regional synergies, and eco-industrial parks (Lowe 1997, Schwarz
and Steininger 1997, Chertow 2007, Geng and Coˆte´ 2002, Massard et al. 2012).
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Figure 2.2: Theoretical framework to analyze the sustainability of industrial
symbiosis networks.
Over the years, many such initiatives have been started, of which the Kalund-
borg industrial symbiosis network in Denmark is probably the world’s best-
known example (Chertow 2000, Jacobsen 2006). It is often also considered the
archetypical industrial symbiosis network and is the textbook example used
as inspiration for other industrial symbiosis initiatives.
2.3.1 Empirical data on industrial symbiosis practices
In order to provide an empirical basis to derive the general characteristics of
industrial symbiosis, this paper expands the perspective beyond the Kalund-
borg example and relies on a collection of fifteen industrial symbiosis net-
works from around the world identified in the literature (see Table 2.1). The
descriptions of the networks stem mainly from the literature on industrial
ecology and environmental engineering. The purpose of this survey is not
to present a comprehensive list of industrial symbiosis networks. For such a
list, the reader is referred to Massard et al. (2012). Their overview does how-
ever not provide sufficient details for this research; therefore, this paper only
uses selected networks that have detailed case descriptions in the scientific
literature. The literature survey has been supplemented by a series of more
in-depth interviews with stakeholders of the Kalundborg industrial symbio-
sis network including some of the participating companies and the organiza-
tional unit.
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Table 2.1: List of industrial symbiosis networks
Industrial symbiosis No. of
companies
Exchange
typesa
Development
typesb
Organizational
unit
Main reference in
literature
Chamusca, Portugal
(Relvao Eco Ind. Park)
15 B D Chamusca
Municipality
(Costa and Ferra˜o
2010)
Eno, Finland (Uimaharju
Industrial Park)
6 B; U S no (Saikku 2006)
Guayama, Puerto Rico,
USA
3 U S Wastewater
Advisory Council
(Chertow and
Lombardi 2005)
Humber region, United
Kingdom
9 B; S D National Industrial
Symbiosis
Programme
(Mirata 2004)
Kalundborg, Denmark 11 B; U; S S Environmental
Club; Symbiosis
Institute
(Jacobsen 2006)
Kansas City, Missouri,
USA
6 B D yes (name n.a.) (Cimren et al. 2011)
Kwinana, Western
Australia
15 B; U D Kwinana
Industries Council
(van Beers et al.
2007)
Continued on next page
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Industrial symbiosis No. of
companies
Exchange
typesa
Development
typesb
Organizational
unit
Main reference in
literature
Nanjangud, South India 14 B; S S no (Bain et al. 2010)
Norrkoping, Sweden
(Handelo bioenergy
complex)
4 B; U D yes (name n.a.) (Martin and
Eklund 2011)
Nova Scotia, Canada
(Burnside Ind. Park)
n/a B; S S no (Geng and Coˆte´
2002)
Rotterdam, The
Netherlands
n/a B; U D Deltalinqs (Baas 2011)
Schkopau, Germany
(Valuepark Schkopau)
14 B; S D no (Liwarska-
Bizukojc et al.
2009)
Styria, Austria 37 B S Karl-Franzens-Uni.
Graz Partnership
(Schwarz and
Steininger 1997)
Tianjin, China 35 B D TEDA
Administrative
Commission
(Shi et al. 2010)
Ulsan, South Korea 36 B; U D Korea Industrial
Complex
Corporation
(Behera et al. 2012)
a Exchange types: B – by-products, U – utilities, S – services; b Development types: S – Spontaneous, D – Designed
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2.3.2 Geographical characteristics
Industrial symbiosis can manifest over different geographical distances from
co-localization in industrial parks to more regional developments (Chertow
2000). Industrial parks, for example in Kwinana and Ulsan, can turn into eco-
industrial parks implementing industrial symbiosis between the already co-
located industries (van Beers et al. 2007, Behera et al. 2012). Similarly, indus-
trial symbiosis was developed inside the city of Kansas by engaging local pro-
duction companies (Cimren et al. 2011). In Germany, several industrial areas
in the Rhine-Neckar region are connected through waste exchanges leading to
a more dispersed regional industrial symbiosis (Sterr and Ott 2004).
In some cases, there has been a significant top-down effort in designing
or creating industrial symbioses by transforming existing industrial parks as
well as implementing industrial symbiosis relationship within geographical
regions. For example, the National Eco-Industrial Park Development Pro-
gram in Korea, and the National Industrial Symbiosis Programme (NISP) in
the United Kingdom are examples of such initiatives (Mirata 2004, Park et al.
2015). In other cases, industrial symbiosis has developed spontaneously as a
bottom-up activity among companies. In Kalundborg, companies have been
co-locating their production plants over the last forty years. The industrial
symbiosis network in Eno, Finland, has an even longer history of engaging
companies from the forestry industry in waste exchange for almost sixty years
(Saikku 2006). According to Boons and Janssen (2004), the use of symbiotic re-
lationships was more common in the nineteenth century when supply chains
were more local. The globalization of supply chains reduced such interactions
within local communities. As such, an increased focus on sustainability might
again cause more localization.
2.3.3 Stakeholders
In accordance with the ecosystem analogy, industrial symbiosis is not just
one supply chain, but a web of inter-dependencies between several compa-
nies, which are also part of their own supply chains, often also global sup-
ply chains. Besides the participating companies in the industrial symbiosis
network, several additional stakeholders may be involved or affected. Since
industrial symbiosis is often organized in industrial areas, they involve local
employment and create job opportunities for the regional economy. In addi-
tion, industrial symbiosis affects the local community by their focus on waste
reduction and energy efficiency. In the case of Kalundborg, the surrounding
municipality is for instance an important stakeholder of the industrial sym-
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biosis as it receives part of its residential heating from the network.
Regulatory bodies are important stakeholders for industrial symbiosis. On
the (inter)national level, landfill and energy usage taxes and waste manage-
ment regulations affect companies in industrial symbiosis. In fact, the EU Di-
rective on Waste (2008/98/EC) mandates member countries to address waste
and by-product reuse (Costa and Ferra˜o 2010). Similarly, regulatory pressure
has been a driver behind industrial symbiosis initiatives in the United States,
Australia, andAsia (Chertow and Lombardi 2005, van Beers et al. 2007, Behera
et al. 2012). Governmental frameworks, such as the NISP in the UK, also facil-
itate information exchange among different industrial symbioses and provide
a feedback loop for policy makers (Mirata 2004). Furthermore, regional gov-
ernments often promote industrial symbiosis initiatives and attract regional
investments, as well as provide financial support for their development (Be-
hera et al. 2012). On the other hand, restrictive waste treatment laws can
act as barriers to industrial symbiosis exchanges (Mirata 2004, Schwarz and
Steininger 1997). An example is Kalundborg, where legislation restricts the
feeding of local pigs with biomass produced as waste from an enzyme factory.
As mentioned previously, the European Commission has a focus on adapting
regulation to facilitate the exchange of by-products as part of its Action Plan
for Circular Economy (EC 2015).
The role of non-governmental organizations is also important in many in-
dustrial symbiosis networks. As can be seen in Table I, more than half of the
networks have an organizational unit, in the form of private organizations,
public agencies, NGOs, as well as research institutes. Activities of the orga-
nizational unit in Ulsan, for example, are to find potential partners, conduct
feasibility studies and to financially support and monitor the commercializa-
tion (Behera et al. 2012). In this case, and in many other industrial symbiosis
cases, like in the NISP and Tianjin, the organizational unit is responsible for
establishing collaboration in the industrial area to improve economic and en-
vironmental performance (Mirata 2004, Shi et al. 2010). In Kalundborg and in
Kwinana, the organizational units comprise local industries that besides inte-
grating environmental considerations into their profit-related objectives also
integrate local community interests (Jacobsen 2006, van Beers et al. 2007). Ad-
ditional activities of the organizational units include monitoring operations,
facilitating studies of the industrial symbiosis, and disseminating knowledge
(nationally and internationally) among other industrial symbiosis initiatives
and academic researchers. Academic research institutes can also be involved
in the organizational unit. For example, in Ulsan the person in charge (project
champion) to drive industrial symbiosis development, to bring businesses to-
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gether and stimulate their further participation was an academic researcher
(Behera et al. 2012). In other another cases researchers are involved indirectly.
For example, researchers from two universities conducted feasibility studies
in the industrial symbiosis development in Rotterdam (Baas 2011). Also, re-
searchers introduced the concept of industrial symbiosis to a local government
in Portugal, when the local government was trying to establish a recycling net-
work in the region of Chamusca (Costa and Ferra˜o 2010).
2.3.4 Expectations, drivers and sustainability performance
This section analyzes pressures and incentives of stakeholders according to
which industrial symbiosis aims to deliver a collaborative sustainable supply
chain effort. As depicted in Figure 2.3, these two aspects meet at the triple
bottom line of sustainability; consequently, this section is structured around
each of the three bottom lines: profit, planet, and people.
Profit related
Ideally, reusing by-products and scrap materials manifests a closed-loop sys-
tem (French and LaForge 2006). Generally speaking, companies invest in
closed-loop supply networks to gain economic benefits and to improve their
environmental profile (Guide and van Wassenhove 2006). By-products in in-
dustrial symbiosis substitute raw materials and are often cheaper than the
original raw materials due their negligible “production” costs and close prox-
imity.
For example, in Nanjangud, Southern India, a company built its business
on making oil from food-grade and biomass residues (such as coffee grounds,
coconut, and sawdust) and selling it to a soap manufacturer (Bain et al. 2010).
In Rotterdam, CO2 recovery from heat suppliers made it possible to supply
hundreds of greenhouses (Baas 2011). This created a new market for wasted
emissions by substituting natural gas combustion at the greenhouses. Flue
gas treatment in power generation from coal results in by-products like fly
ashes and gypsum that can be reused in cement factories and by plasterboard
manufacturers, allowing producers in the vicinity of the plants to save sig-
nificant transportation costs by avoiding delivery from abroad (Schwarz and
Steininger 1997, Jacobsen 2006). Additionally, power plants generate excess
energy in the form of steam and heat, which can be reused in other industrial
processes; consequently, their onsite production can be avoided (Chertow and
Lombardi 2005). In Kalundborg, treated organic sludge from a large biotech
company partnering in the industrial symbiosis is used as fertilizer, which
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provides collective benefits. In fact, companies avoid disposal costs by sup-
plying their organic waste to local farms instead of disposing it in a landfill
and farmers obtain cheap organic fertilizer. In some cases, collaborative ben-
efits emerge through shared logistical services, including storing processing
and transportation (Bain et al. 2010, Geng and Coˆte´ 2002, Mirata 2004).
Investing in industrial symbiosis is generally considered as an efficiency
improvement project with a return of investment of one to three years, how-
ever, this period can be exceeded in some cases (Mirata 2004, Baas 2011). Fi-
nancial conditions of by-product treatment, storage, and delivery, is one of
the first reasons why companies would reject the idea of industrial symbio-
sis. Furthermore, changing economic conditions may inhibit the expansion of
the network or even cause companies to change back to more conventional
economic development (Gibbs and Deutz 2007). Due to the substantial initial
costs of industrial symbiosis relationships, companies often rely on financial
support from private investors and governmental bodies (e.g. Behera et al.
2012, Shi et al. 2010). Without such support or in case of long payback peri-
ods, companies will often be reluctant to participate. For example, an indus-
trial symbiosis initiative in Sweden was phased out when the research and
external subsidies ended in 2006 (Mirata and Emtairah 2005, Baas 2011).
Planet related
Essentially, activities in the supply chain have the potential to degrade the
natural environment by depleting its resources and deteriorating the environ-
mental quality with waste disposal and pollution emission (Gupta 1995). In
fact, industrial symbiosis reduces the amount of waste that would otherwise
be landfilled or released as emissions to air or water and at the same time it im-
proves companies’ resource efficiency by emphasizing material reuse, avoid-
ing the environmental impacts accompanying the extraction or production of
virgin resources. Furthermore, utilization of wastewater components and ex-
cess heat and steam exchanges in industrial symbiosis contribute to the opti-
mized use of energy and water that is one of the main features of industrial
ecosystems (Frosch and Gallopoulos 1989). The Kalundborg industrial sym-
biosis is one of the pioneers of such energy and water cascading (Jacobsen
2006). Saving energy also reduces pollution emission indirectly by reducing
the need for example electricity from power plants.
The companies’ typical main driver in industrial symbiosis besides earning
profit is to cope with environmental regulations. For example, in Portugal, a
new environmental law, which was calling for improved waste management,
triggered the organization of the Chamusca industrial symbiosis (Costa and
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Ferra˜o 2010). Similarly, in Puerto Rico, a US regulation specifying that energy
providers must also produce output other than electricity initiated steam pro-
duction at the power plant, which served as a basis for the Guayama industrial
symbiosis (Chertow and Lombardi 2005). In Australia, the increased commu-
nity and governmental pressure to protect the marine environment initiated
the establishment of the Kwinana Industries Council, which became the orga-
nizational unit for the local industrial symbiosis (van Beers et al. 2007).
However, companies don’t always need regulatory incentives to trigger
industrial symbiosis. For example, environment-oriented behaviour of com-
panies was observed in Nanjangud, South India, where the recycling of non-
hazardous industrial by-products and other wastes has been implemented in
the absence of regulatory framework (Bain et al. 2010). On the other hand,
industrial symbiosis activities do not always meet the environmental perfor-
mance expectations, particularly when the involved companies are focused
only on their economic interests and the broader environmental implications
are overlooked (Ashton 2011).
Innovation in terms of clean technologies born from symbiotic relation-
ships is rare since companies often focus on the reuse of waste, and not its
prevention. Consequently, an important concern about industrial symbiosis
is that it perpetuates waste streams instead of preventing them (Duflou et al.
2012). For example, promoting the cogeneration heat and power plant in the
Humber region industrial symbiosis could potentially counteract the feasibil-
ity of any future renewable energy projects (Mirata 2004). At the same time,
national initiatives to ensure a CO2 neutral energy system in Denmark limit
the long-term viability of leveraging excess utilities from the central power
plant in the Kalundborg industrial symbiosis.
Although industrial symbiosis is typically based on old production tech-
nologies, innovation in products and processes can certainly play a role. For
example, in the Handelo¨ industrial symbiosis, biofuel production has been re-
searched and implemented on industrial scale, and it now successfully fuels
public transportation vehicles in Norrko¨ping (Martin and Eklund 2011). In
Kalundborg, small scale production plants have recently been implemented
in order to test and scale up algae farms producing biomass fed on wastewa-
ter and to produce second generation biofuel from wheat straw. Furthermore,
the research and development related to by-product reuse contributed to envi-
ronmentally superior technical and organizational innovations in the German
chemical industry (Sterr and Ott 2004). Therefore, industrial symbiosis also
has the potential to be a driver of innovation for regional sustainability (Baas
2011).
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People related
The people affected by operations include employees, consumers, as well as
the general population living in the proximity of the supply chain operations
(Tang and Zhou 2012). In fact, industrial parks employ people on a large scale,
and their contribution to the local community’s development can therefore be
significant. Accordingly, many industrial symbiosis initiatives were primar-
ily driven by job creation opportunities (Gibbs and Deutz 2007). For exam-
ple, the Kalundborg industrial symbiosis, which is a medium-sized symbio-
sis, provides jobs to more than four thousand employees, a considerable share
of which would not be employed without the activities fostered by the indus-
trial symbiosis; and the relatively small-scale development of the Valuepark
Schkopau in Germany created seven hundred jobs (Liwarska-Bizukojc et al.
2009). A new production unit to utilize excess steam in Ulsan, South Korea,
resulted in more than a hundred new jobs (Behera et al. 2012).
Companies in industrial symbiosis have also been known to promote the
personal development and well-being of their employees. Also, the organi-
zational unit of the Ulsan industrial symbiosis organizes training sessions to
educate people and guide companies in the creation of a better work environ-
ment (Behera et al. 2012). Additionally, for active public promotion and en-
couraging public participation in Ulsan, successful industrial symbiosis cases
are advertised through electronic media and newspaper.
By reducing the companies’ environmental impact, industrial symbiosis
also enhances the local community’s image with cleaner landscapes, air and
water. Industrial symbiosis may also incorporate waste streams (e.g. solid
waste andwastewater) from the local municipality, and excess heat can also be
supplied to the local community (Saikku 2006, Jacobsen 2006, Baas 2011). As
a result of available jobs, a healthy environment, and economic potential, in-
dustrial symbiosis has the potential to attract people to municipalities, which
might otherwise face decreasing population, thereby contributing to regional
development.
Industrial symbiosis not only emphasizes social responsibility by employ-
ment, but also by maintaining close social relationships within the supply net-
works (Schwarz and Steininger 1997). Social networking is often used to cre-
ate a balanced business environment and enhance collaboration (Lamming
et al. 2000). Indeed, as previously mentioned, trust, open communication,
and joint problem solving are essential for the functioning of the industrial
symbiosis, and are leveraged through social networking (Baas 2011). Thereby,
companies in industrial symbiosis emphasize transparency and disseminate
information among business partners. According to Carter and Rogers (2008),
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transparency also works the other way around, by actively engaging stake-
holders to secure their commitment and improve supply chain processes. As
transparency should also reduce unethical (or illegal) behaviour, social sus-
tainability is further improved, while at the same time the transaction costs
for external stakeholders interested in assessing a companies’ social responsi-
bility is reduced (Carter and Rogers 2008).
2.4 Supply network collaboration in industrial sym-
biosis
Figure 2.1 summarized the organizational and operational aspects of the col-
laborative efforts between companies in industrial symbiosis networks that
facilitate sustainability performance. The following sections give an overview
of challenges that the collaboration faces, discussing first the organizational
inter-dependencies and the role of organization and secondly the operational
aspects of industrial symbiosis developments.
2.4.1 Organizational challenges in industrial symbiosis
Industrial symbiosis networks can create a context for collective problem def-
inition and an interface to develop solutions in a collaborative manner (Mi-
rata and Emtairah 2005). An organizational unit can facilitate these processes.
industrial symbiosis examples show the importance of centrally organized
local meetings (e.g. business match-making) where companies have oppor-
tunity to meet each other, attract new companies and establish personal re-
lationships (e.g. Costa and Ferra˜o 2010, Behera et al. 2012). On these meet-
ings, regional problems, stakeholder expectations and development plans are
discussed (e.g. Mirata 2004, Costa and Ferra˜o 2010, Baas 2011). The orga-
nizational unit also provides a shortcut between the companies and the lo-
cal authorities and may be used to provide information about environmen-
tally sustainable actions (Mirata 2004). Such communication channels allow
the presentation of ideas, the exchange of project experiences, and learning
about stakeholder expectations (Costa and Ferra˜o 2010). Knowledge and ex-
perience sharing emphasizes the collective learning of companies, which en-
hances their collective capacity to identify new perspectives for development
(Simatupang et al. 2002). Collective learning in industrial symbiosis facilitates
the understanding of region-specific capabilities and cultural change associ-
ated with sustainability (Gibbs and Deutz 2007). The resulting region-specific
knowledge allows companies to identify common problems and jointly work
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out mutually beneficial solutions. Identifying incentives can lead to collabora-
tive projects for sustainability improvements where companies share interests.
For example, in Kalundborg, groundwater deficit had been a collective prob-
lem for water-consuming industries for decades. As a result of collaboration
a number of private and public projects has been initiated including symbio-
sis between water-consuming industries (Jacobsen 2006). Collective learning
may also enhance the innovation capability of companies (Bansal and McK-
night 2009); thus, collective learning in industrial symbiosis may increase the
regional competitiveness in a sustainable way. For example, in Tianjin, to pre-
vent further farmland degradation companies developed an innovative tech-
nology to produce new soil from a combination of sea sediment, caustic soda
sludge and fly ash (Shi et al. 2010). Especially for SMEs, such external inputs
are often a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for development of envi-
ronmental capabilities (Lee and Klassen 2008).
Although a central organization may play an important role in industrial
symbiosis, the supply network is also self-organized by the participating com-
panies (Lowe 1997). Coordination of businesses in the industrial symbiosis
network ensures long-term sustainability with strategic alignment. Incentive
alignment between companies in an industrial symbiosis is facilitated by mu-
tually shared interests for economic gains and reduced environmental im-
pact. Their long-term commitment also depends on the equivalent sharing
of risks and benefits (Behera et al. 2012). On the other hand, incentive align-
ment is difficult to achieve when companies are forced into contracts without
knowing the potential risks and benefits of participating in industrial sym-
biosis. In the Humber region industrial symbiosis in the UK, for example,
only around 20 out of 150 contacted companies showed interests in the pro-
gram due to the lack of trust and information (Mirata 2004). Furthermore,
inter-dependencies in industrial symbiosis are sometimes asymmetric, which
means that one party hasmore power than the other(s). In fact, industrial sym-
biosis often settles around “powerful” companies, for example power plants,
water supply/treatment facilities and chemical producers, which are able to
provide a large amount of by-products, excess utilities, or services (Jacobsen
2006, Liwarska-Bizukojc et al. 2009). These so-called anchor organizations can
create a critical mass for industrial symbiosis development, but their market
exit is also a potential risk for the symbiosis (Chertow 2000).
Losing a by-product supplier or buyer, for example due to relocation, or
due to a change in the by-product characteristics, can endanger the integrity
of the symbiotic network. Furthermore, by-product exchanges can create a
technological lock between the companies. Building a symbiotic exchange on
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technologies that may become obsolete in the future undermines the sustain-
ability of industrial symbiosis. Furthermore, industrial symbiosis is exposed
to changes in the contemporary regulatory framework.
It is however important to note that not all wastes are hazardous, and that
waste is unlikely to be entirely eliminated through cleaner production and
pollution prevention (Erkman 1997, Lowe 1997). Therefore, industrial sym-
biosis can be a long-term, feasible option for companies that generate non-
hazardous wastes if the waste streams are sustained. Nevertheless, if compa-
nies don’t see or lose economic incentives in the by-product exchange, they
will not participate or exit the industrial symbiosis. Consequently, the main
organizational challenge concerning the sustainability of industrial symbiosis
is to integrate sustainable technologies, which can run without undermining
their own basis. A further challenge is to sustain the economic incentives be-
tween the participants as well as to win their trust in the collaboration. Gov-
ernmental regulations and central organization on regional level can facilitate
these initiatives. Indeed, trust and consistent information are important en-
ablers of strategic alliance in collaborative supply networks (Hoyt and Huq
2000). In industrial symbiosis, trust among the broad set of stakeholders (e.g.
industries, governments, environmental and local interests groups) is an en-
abler of knowledge and information sharing and is essential for long-term
business relationships (Baas 2011). Trust between companies is determined
by preexisting links but can also be developed through social networking.
2.4.2 Operational challenges in industrial symbiosis
Operational aspects of industrial symbiosis comprehend the management of
material exchanges. Generally speaking, the spectrum of material exchanges
in industrial symbiosis spans from simple dyadic (supplier-buyer) relation-
ships to networks involving several buyers and suppliers. An industrial sym-
biosis typically involves multiple of such inter-dependencies. Additionally,
companies in industrial symbiosis may complement incoming by-product str-
eams with original raw materials. Dyadic relationships between two plants in
industrial symbiosis may evolve to reciprocal by-product exchanges; for ex-
ample, in Nanjangud, a beverage producer provides coffee grounds to an oil
processor, who in turn provides biomass fuel to the beverage producer (and
other companies).
In industrial symbiosis, a supplier can be a sole provider of industrial
waste for several buyers (Bain et al. 2010). Cogeneration power and heat
plants typically supply excess steam and heat to more than one buyer due to
the fact that this form of excess energy is useful in many industries (Jacobsen
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2006). Similarly, one can receive industrial wastes from more than one plant.
For example, in Ulsan, a company receives and processes zinc waste from
three plants inside the industrial symbiosis and provides the value added
product to a paint producer (Behera et al. 2012). In fact, relationships within
industrial symbiosis can connect more levels of actors leading to a chain of
suppliers and buyers. Moreover, a company may participate in more material
exchanges at the same time. For example, in Nova Scotia, industrial waste col-
lectors recover by-products such as paints, oils and scrap materials (Geng and
Coˆte´ 2002). Nevertheless, ongoing production is not always necessary to have
a feedstock of by-products. For example, in Kwinana, a stockpile of gypsum
waste from the 1980s is now utilized by plasterboard manufacturers and local
farmers (van Beers et al. 2007).
By-products and scrap materials are frequent output of process industries,
such as chemical, oil, steel, forestry, agricultural, and food industries Fransoo
and Rutten (1994). Due to the divergent production processes, many products
are produced from a few rawmaterials, and production often yields unwanted
but also un-avoidable by-products. Based on the available case studies, it is
clear that industrial symbiosis mainly involves process industries and often
involves water and energy treatment and supply. Sometimes, industrial sym-
biosis also incorporates other waste streams like electronic waste, end-of-life
vehicle handling or municipal solid waste treatment (e.g. Geng and Coˆte´ 2002,
Costa and Ferra˜o 2010, Bain et al. 2010).
The feasibility of industrial symbiosis is affected by its geographical range
(Sterr and Ott 2004, Gibbs and Deutz 2007). Intuitively, by increasing the ge-
ographical range, the number of potential partners is higher and total supply
and demand of by-products (and excess utilities) also grows. Furthermore, by
involving more companies in the by-product exchange, the economic viabil-
ity improves and the system becomes more resistant to fluctuations or failures
(Lowe 1997, Sterr and Ott 2004). However, increasing the distance inherently
decreases the cost effectiveness of the by-product exchange and adds to the
environmental impact due to the increased effort in transportation. Moreover,
longer distance in case of perishable materials is explicitly infeasible. In short,
there is a trade-off between the geographical range and the efficiency of an
industrial symbiosis.
Operational considerations in industrial symbiosis relate to the manage-
ment of production, transportation, and use of industrial waste, as well as the
synchronization of these logistical activities between supplier and buyer on a
tactical level. Before usage, exchanged materials often need to go through ad-
ditional treatment processes, storage, and transportation (Duflou et al. 2012).
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The treatment of by-products may require individual value adding processes
such asmixing, separating, forming, or chemical reactions (Flapper et al. 2002).
The resulting bulk materials can be transported by trucks. In some industrial
symbioses, a joint distribution service is used to reduce the logistical effort
(e.g. Geng and Coˆte´ 2002). Furthermore, utility exchanges (e.g. steam and wa-
ter) usually involve pressure conservation and settling and require a pipeline
network for delivery (Jacobsen 2006). On the other end of the supply chain,
being able to use a by-product possibly involves process adjustments because
it might differ from the previously used original raw materials (Duflou et al.
2012).
Natural variations in product quality lead to variability in by-product quan-
tity (through different yields) and quality (Fransoo and Rutten 1994). Depend-
ing on the requirements of the buyer, such quality variations can inhibit sym-
biotic relationships (Bansal and McKnight 2009). Furthermore, the availabil-
ity of industrial waste is the result of a push process, meaning that surplus
or shortage can occur due to the variability in supply and demand, and the
different seasonal characteristics in different industries. In order to deal with
surplus and shortage in industrial symbiosis, industrial waste may need to be
stored, excess waste might have to be disposed, additional original raw mate-
rials may need to be purchased, or limited waste quantities might have to be
divided over multiple interested buyers. From the cases, it seems that a signif-
icant part of the exchanged by-products in industrial symbiosis are durable,
meaning that inventories can be stored. Nevertheless, holding by-product in-
ventory requires additional space and incurs costs. Other by-products like
waste oils and biomass are perishable. Moreover, the exchange of utilities,
such as steam and heat, implies very strict perishability.
Generally speaking, by-products are different from original materials, and
consequently, operatingwith by-products increases the effort in designing and
operating storage facilities and production systems. Also, alternating between
by-products and original raw materials or combining them complicates the
production. This includes both technical aspects such as storage space and
equipment connectivity, as well as operational aspects such as inventory man-
agement, purchasing of raw materials, and planning of production with mul-
tiple material sources. Furthermore, the sourcing of by-products and original
raw materials simultaneously might affect agreements with original raw ma-
terial suppliers, potentially leading to higher costs.
Aggregate and temporal logistical information concerning waste streams
is important in order to evaluate potential by-product exchanges. Therefore,
a central information system, where companies are able to share information
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Figure 2.3: Identification of organizational and operational challenges in in-
dustrial symbiosis networks
about their waste streams and learn about other companies, can be used in
the development phase of industrial symbiosis (Sterr and Ott 2004, Grant
et al. 2010). It can however be challenging to obtain such information from
companies. The assessment of material flows (e.g. quantity, quality, distri-
bution over time) can be used to optimize the network design and material
flows in terms of costs and environmental impacts. For example, the imple-
mentation of the Kansas City industrial symbiosis was supported by an op-
timization model that evaluated the different configurations of potential par-
ticipants (Cimren et al. 2011). However, temporal dynamics of supply and
demand of by-products have so far not been captured by information systems
or by production and inventory management (Grant et al. 2010, Cimren et al.
2011). Nevertheless, a resulting logistical synchronization capability would
have positive impact on the supply network’s operational efficiency.
Figure 3 summarizes the organizational and operational challenges of in-
dustrial symbiosis that were identified in the analysis.
2.5 Conclusion and future work
To improve the environmental sustainability of operations management, re-
cent research suggested building bridges between operations management
and industrial ecology. Industrial symbiosis, as a concrete implementation
of industrial ecology, pursues industrial ecosystem thinking in which compa-
nies from different industries form a supply network collaboration based on
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the local recycling of industrial waste, by-products, and excess utilities.
Previous literature finds that industrial symbiosis networks support re-
gional sustainable development by improving the companies’ resource effi-
ciency and competitiveness, creating new employment, and by contributing to
a cleaner natural environment. Companies in industrial symbiosis networks
show significant effort in achieving competitive advantage in a collectively
beneficial way by emphasizing cooperation.
From a supply network collaboration perspective, this paper shows that
industrial symbiosis emphasizes transparency, shared cultural norms, social
networking, and trust, which all allow companies to understand each other’s
capabilities and to form strategic alliances based on economic drivers as well
as social and environmental responsibility. The existence of central organi-
zational units distinguishes industrial symbiosis from other supply network
collaborations. The organizational unit contributes to the development of in-
dustrial symbiosis networks by functioning as a central hub that augments
communication between stakeholders, facilitates business match-making and
helps region specific collective learning. As such, it seems to help address
some of the organizational challenges identified in this paper.
Industrial symbiosis also implies risks for the participants due to high lev-
els of inter-dependency in supplier-buyer relationships; consequently, com-
panies have concerns regarding such long-term collaboration. Nevertheless,
in many of the analyzed cases, industrial symbiosis demonstrated resilience
over several decades. Moreover, examples show that companies in industrial
symbiosis networks, driven by profitability and resource scarcity as well as
pressure of governmental regulations, are able to deliver innovative solutions
in terms of non-hazardous waste utilization. Yet, focusing and integrating
sustainable technologies based on waste exchange and engaging companies
in long-term partnerships are great challenges to industrial symbiosis.
On an operational level, industrial symbiosis engages companies in the
collection, treatment and storage of by-products and delivering them to other
producers. Previous research, which often modeled by-product exchanges on
an aggregate level, points to trade-offs between the geographical distance be-
tween supplier and buyer and the related resource efficiency of industrial
symbiosis. However, temporal dynamics in industrial symbiosis have not
been addressed. One key question is how to manage a lack of synchronicity
between by-product supply and demand, which originates at different pro-
duction facilities with potentially different seasonal characteristics as well as
short-term variability. This implies inventory management challenges, which
could possibly be addressed by synchronizing by-product exchanges between
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multiple suppliers and buyers. This would reduce by-product quantity un-
certainties and potentially increase the feasibility of long-term supply and de-
mand agreements. Furthermore, dealingwith quality variations of by-products
and their integration with other rawmaterial sources can lead to procurement
and production management challenges. These problems might be addressed
with further by-product treatment (e.g. separation and mixing) and by alter-
nating between or combining by-products and original raw materials. Con-
sequently, there are ample opportunities for further research regarding by-
product inventory management and production planning that combine dif-
ferent by-products with original materials.
Even though financial considerations remain the driving factor of compa-
nies within industrial symbiosis, increasingly scarce natural resources and in-
creasing regulation on waste and emissions will cause companies to more and
more consider the environmental and social implications of their operations.
In the EU, the European Commission’s Action Plan for Circular Economy
identifies industrial symbiosis as a central strategy to increase resource effi-
ciency in order to promote European environmental sustainability and reduce
the dependency of European industries on external raw material supplies.
Clearly, in order to be successful, industrial symbiosis needs specific circum-
stances, which involve facilitating regulatory frameworks, and require long-
term commitment from companies. However, in light of new economic, en-
vironmental, and social challenges, the local industrial waste recycling lever-
aged in industrial symbiosis networks might be a viable route towards the
sustainability of production operations if the underlying technologies are se-
lected carefully, and the European action plan suggests a number of initiatives
to improve the conditions for industrial symbiosis.
The overview of the key organizational and operational challenges given
in this paperwith regard to supply chain collaboration supports amuch needed
improved understanding of the collaborative supply network dimension of
industrial symbiosis networks, helping to assess the economic, environmen-
tal, and social performance of current and future initiatives.

CHAPTER 3
Resource-based competitive advantage
This chapter is based on a manuscript to be submitted for publication under the title
“Toward a theory of competitiveness in industrial symbiosis networks: A resource-
based view”. The manuscript is co-authored by Ga´bor Herczeg, Renzo Akkerman and
Michael Zwicky Hauschild.
Abstract
Industrial symbiosis is built on synergistic transactions between firms to
mimicking the flow of materials in natural ecosystems: undesired pro-
duction output becomes raw material in another industrial process. From
a management perspective, industrial symbiosis is a proactive environ-
mental strategy emphasizing community, connectedness and cooperation
in a system of diverse organizations including firms and external stake-
holders. However, economic considerations remain pivotal for partici-
pating firms. Consequently, firms collaborate in industrial symbiosis for
collective competitive advantage. This paper grounds industrial sym-
biosis in the theory of competitiveness using eight previously published
cases. Based on the natural-resource-based view of the firm, the relational
view of cooperation, and the contingent resource-based view the key ca-
pabilities and resources in industrial symbiosis networks are attributed
to three dimensions: the proactive environmental stance of individual
firms, the cooperative relations, including strategic alliance and network
embeddedness, and the business environment, involving institutionaliza-
tion and an organizational unit that are contingent to the network. It is
argued that industrial symbiosis networks are difficult to imitate because
their initiation draws on tacit personnel skills, faces partner scarcity, and
involves institutionalization; furthermore, their progression requires life
cycle thinking, inter-organizational asset interconnectedness, and an or-
ganizational unit that coordinates the sustainability effort and the trans-
actions in the network.
47
48 Chapter 3. Resource-based competitive advantage
3.1 Introduction
Industrial operations have long-lasting effects on our environment, includ-
ing the communities we live in. This is mainly caused by an ever increasing
extraction and processing of raw materials and the production of undesired
outputs in the form of waste and emissions to the environment. Firms that ad-
dress sustainability concerns, such as resource depletion and pollution, often
pursue environmental strategies that are to improve internal operations and
extended supply chains (Kleindorfer et al. 2005). However, competitiveness
remains pivotal in the development of these strategies (Corbett and Klassen
2006, Vachon and Klassen 2008).
Sustainable supply chain management indicates opportunities related to
the use of undesired production outputs, such as waste and by-products (Lin-
ton et al. 2007). Consequently, pollution prevention contributes to increased
resource productivity, innovation, and competitiveness (Porter and van der
Linde 1995). Furthermore, an industrial ecosystem suggests an ideal, inte-
grated production model where the consumption of energy and materials are
optimized, waste disposal is minimized, and the undesired outputs of one
process serve as raw material another process (Frosch and Gallopoulos 1989).
A well-knownmanifestation of industrial ecosystems is industrial symbio-
sis. It is defined as a collective approach to competitive advantage based upon
substituting virgin raw materials of a firm with another firm’s wastes or by-
products (Chertow 2000). Industrial symbiosis initiatives are numerous and
can be found all over the world, from the well-known 50-year-old example
in Kalundborg, Denmark (Jacobsen 2006) to more recent examples in Canada
(Bansal and McKnight 2009), the United States (Cimren et al. 2011) and Asia
(Zhu and Coˆte´ 2004).
Industrial symbiosis involves a tight network of diverse supply chain rela-
tionships, where firms capitalize on the opportunities afforded by geograph-
ical proximity, excess materials, and potentially useful wastes (Bansal and
McKnight 2009). Furthermore, opportunities to obtain competitive advantage
through industrial symbiosis are often attributed to improved resource pro-
ductivity, innovative product or process changes, increasing revenue, diversi-
fying business, and managing risk (Esty and Porter 1998, Lombardi and Lay-
bourn 2012). Even though it is argued that industrial symbiosis contributes to
collective competitive advantage, it has not been previously grounded in the
theory of competitiveness (Hoffman et al. 2014).
In this paper we therefore address industrial symbiosis using the resource-
based theory of competitiveness. More specifically, we investigate the initia-
tion and progression of industrial symbiosis networks, based on the natural-
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resource-based view of the firm (Hart 1995), the relational view of coopera-
tion (Dyer and Singh 1998), and the contingent resource-based view (Arago´n-
Correa and Sharma 2003). We identify the key resources and capabilities and
analyze their role in industrial symbiosis, using a survey of 8 previously pub-
lished case studies. By induction, we derive propositions on how supply
chain management leverages these resources and capabilities on the level of
the firm, the network, and the business environment, to obtain a competitive
advantage during the initiation and progression of industrial symbiosis.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section,
we describe our methodology including the theoretical foundation and data
sources we draw on. Afterwards, we elaborate on three fundamental dimen-
sions of resources and capabilities in the management of industrial symbiosis,
and then discuss them to derive propositions that build toward a theory of
competitiveness in industrial symbiosis networks. Finally, we conclude our
findings, provide managerial implications, and outline future research oppor-
tunities.
3.2 Methodology
Industrial symbiosis has been extensively studied for almost two decades (Yu
et al. 2013). There is a vast amount of empirical research narrating industrial
symbiosis examples from all over the word, explaining the role of integra-
tion (Zhu and Coˆte´ 2004), quantifying its economic and environmental im-
pacts (Jacobsen 2006), identifying triggers and barriers of development (van
Beers et al. 2007), emphasizing the importance of coordination and coopera-
tion (Bansal and McKnight 2009), and reporting on the role of facilitator orga-
nizations (Paquin and Howard-Grenville 2012).
In this paper, we use existing case studies of industrial symbiosis for build-
ing theory. Theory building from cases is an inductive form of research pro-
ducing testable theoretical propositions from data (Eisenhardt and Graebner
2007). Using existing cases has been deemed appropriate in situations where
empirical evidence is largely contained in case studies (Yin and Heald 1975,
Jauch et al. 1980).
To build theory based on multiple cases researched from different aspects
it is necessary to first define a common ground for analysis (Eisenhardt and
Graebner 2007). Our objective is to theorize competitive advantage in indus-
trial symbiosis including the level of the firm, the network, and the business
environment. We choose the resource-based view to ground our work, be-
cause this theory attributes sustained competitive advantage to idiosyncratic
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resources of the firm (Barney 1991). The natural-resource based view focuses
on capabilities and resources developed driven by challenges and constraints
posed by the natural environment (Hart 1995), which are also key drivers for
industrial symbiosis. In addition, the theory has been extended to cooperative
relationships (Dyer and Singh 1998) between firms, thereby capturing coop-
eration and coordination in industrial symbiosis networks. Furthermore, the
contingent resource based-view of environmental strategies (Arago´n-Correa
and Sharma 2003) points to contingencies of the general business environ-
ment that moderate the impact of resources and capabilities on competitive
advantage, which is a relevant extension in case of industrial symbiosis. Be-
fore introducing data, we elaborate on the logic behind the resource-based
view and on its terminology.
3.2.1 Resource-based theory of competitiveness
In general, resources are defined as tangible and intangible firm-specific assets
that could be thought as a strength (or weakness) of a given firm (Wernerfelt
1984). Example for resources are: a good location for a business, products
and distribution channels, contracts, patents, production procedures, skilled
employees, managerial routines, tacit know-how, and access to information.
Resources are a source of competitive advantage if they are valuable in
the sense that they help to exploit opportunities and/or neutralize threats,
and if they are rare among competitors (Barney 1991). Furthermore, inter-
organizational competitive advantage is obtained from inter-firm relation-spe-
cific resources developed in strategic alliances (Dyer and Singh 1998).
By definition, a resource possessed by a large number of other firms, or
a resource that is perfectly imitable or substitutable cannot be a source of
sustained competitive advantage (Barney 1991). For example, assets that are
available on commercial markets typically cannot be associatedwith sustained
competitive advantage. In general, resources can be imperfectly imitable for
one or a combination of three reasons: resources are developed under unique
historical conditions, resources are socially complex that is they are a result
of diverse personal interactions, or the link between competitive advantage
and resources is causally ambiguous (Dierickx and Cool 1989). Furthermore,
inter-organizational competitive advantage is imperfectly imitable as a result
of asset interconnectedness, partner scarcity, resource indivisibility and insti-
tutions (Dyer and Singh 1998).
The natural-resource-based view of the firm attributes competitive advan-
tage to dynamic capabilities and resources associated with a proactive envi-
ronmental strategy (Hart 1995, Hart and Dowell 2011). Dynamic organiza-
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tional capabilities are the ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal
and external competences (resources) to achieve new and innovative forms
of competitive advantage (Teece et al. 1997). The combination of internal and
external resources implies competitive action complementedwith cooperative
action and the integration of stakeholder perspectives (Hart 1995). A proactive
environmental strategy, such as pollution prevention or product stewardship,
is a dynamic strategic capability associated with specific assets, patterns of
behavior and learning, and development paths of managerial routines (Teece
et al. 1997, Hart and Dowell 2011).
A proactive environmental strategy enables an organization to align itself
with changes in the business environment (Arago´n-Correa and Sharma 2003).
The business environment implies contingencies, such as uncertainty, com-
plexity, and munificence, moderating the likelihood that a firm will use its ca-
pabilities and resources to develop environmental strategies and the associa-
tion between an environmental strategy and competitive advantage (Arago´n-
Correa and Sharma 2003).
3.2.2 Selected cases studies of industrial symbiosis
A multiple-case research method, has to undergo a clear case selection proce-
dure (Larsson 1991), in which the selection of cases needs to cover the spec-
trum of variables that differentiate over the population (Eisenhardt 1989). Even
though published case studies of industrial symbiosis are generally not ana-
lyzed from a resource-based view, case descriptions do often include a signif-
icant amount of material on organizational resources and capabilities.
There are many theoretical aspects of industrial symbiosis to consider, in-
cluding its different spatial configurations, its evolutionary stages, and its type
of organization (Chertow and Ehrenfeld 2012). In our case selection, we draw
on the organizational aspect of industrial symbiosis networks because organi-
zational capabilities and resources are central for our paper. The polar types of
our spectrum of industrial symbiosis are spontaneous (self-organized) and fa-
cilitated (centrally planned) organization (Chertow and Ehrenfeld 2012). While
self-organized industrial symbiosis evolves spontaneously, driven in part by
regulatory demands; facilitated symbioses are typically governmental initia-
tives (Lowe 1997). However, a common feature of both types is that they typ-
ically manifest a central organizational unit that institutionalizes industrial
symbiosis among the firms and external stakeholders (Chertow and Ehren-
feld 2012).
A prime example of spontaneous emergence is the industrial symbiosis
in Kalundborg, Denmark, where symbiotic activities date back to the early
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1970’s, initiated by the utilization of by-product flows from a thermal power
plant and an adjacent oil refinery. Since then, organizational units have evolved
establishing a culture of cooperation across industries and regional develop-
ment efforts (Jacobsen and Anderberg 2004). Another example is the Guitang
Group in China, which has been integrating sugar refining with industrial
processes outside their core business for decades; consequently, they operate
several by-product flows across their value chains (Zhu and Coˆte´ 2004).
Governmental initiatives, such as the National Eco-industrial Park Devel-
opment Program in South Korea and China, are driven by a desire to update
aging industrial park infrastructure, reduce costs through increased coopera-
tion, and identify new business opportunities based on available production
outputs while reducing environmental impact (Behera et al. 2012, Yu et al.
2014). The National Industrial Symbiosis Programme (NISP) in the UK is an
umbrella program for developing industrial symbiosis networks in different
regions of the country through regional development agencies (Mirata 2004).
In our collection of empirical data on industrial symbiosis, we only rely on
publications built on structured interviews with managers and quantitative
data to build theory around industrial symbiosis. Furthermore, we have only
selected cases for which the research material offered sufficient description
for the later inference. As a result, we selected eight different well-studied
cases of industrial symbiosis networks resembling the list that was used by
(Chertow and Ehrenfeld 2012). The cases are summarized in Table 3.1.
3.3 Identification and analysis of capabilities and
resources
In general, firms in industrial symbiosis bring an environmentally proactive
strategy in action. They focus on the productive use of undesired produc-
tion outputs instead of their ultimate prevention (see Table 3.1 for a list of
by-products and wastes used in the selected cases). Although industrial sym-
biosis networks are partly reactions to environmental regulations, they are
proactive because they exhibit a consistent pattern of environmental practices
including voluntary actions over time (Sharma and Vredenburg 1998).
Furthermore, industrial symbiosis networks emphasize community, coop-
eration, and coordination among firms, which serves to protect environmen-
tal integrity, social equity, and economic prosperity of the region (Bansal and
McKnight 2009). In other words, firms in industrial symbiosis networks build
strategic alliances.
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Table 3.1: Overview of the selected industrial symbiosis networks
Industrial
symbiosis
Typical facilities
involved
By-product
production lines
Organization Organizational Unit
/Institutionalization
Reason for initiation References
Kalundborg,
Denmark
Coal-fired power
plant,
pharmaceuticals,
plaster board, oil
refining, fish
farming
Water, wastewater,
sulfur, steam,
sludge, fly ash, yeast
and organic
residuals
Spontaneous Environmental
Club; Symbiosis
Institute
Emission regulations;
economic motivation
is connected to direct
savings and indirect
operational
performance
Jacobsen and
Anderberg (2004),
Jacobsen (2006),
Ehrenfeld and
Gertler (1997)
Kwinana,
Australia
Coal-fired power
plant, chemicals,
fertilizer producers,
cement,
construction, oil
refining
Organic waste,
sludge, acid, ash,
dust, chemical
catalysts, organic
waste, energy
production
Spontaneous Kwinana Industrial
Council; Center of
Sustainable
Resource Processing
Regulations regarding
air and water quality;
sustainable minerals
processing is
concerned with
finding ways to
eliminate waste
van Beers et al.
(2007)
Barceloneta,
Puerto Rico
Coal-fired power
plant, chemical
refining,
pharmaceuticals
Wastewater,
condensate, steam,
ash, solvents
Spontaneous Barceloneta
Wastewater
Treatment
Corporation
Advisory Council
Comply with water
pollution regulations;
motivated by
lowering cost of waste
disposal and
accessing limited
water supply
Ashton (2008, 2009,
2011)
Styria, Austria Sawmills, mining,
textiles, chemicals,
power plant, cement
plant
Ash, plastics,
sludge, wood and
paper, heat, petrol
coke, slag, dust, oil
Spontaneous Karl-Franzens-
Universitat Graz
Partnership
Triggered by the
additional revenue
and avoided disposal
and procurement
costs
Schwarz and
Steininger (1997)
Continued on next page
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Industrial
symbiosis
Typical facilities
involved
By-product
production lines
Organization Organizational Unit
/Institutionalization
Reason for initiation References
Guitang Group,
China
Sugar refining,
alcohol, pulp and
paper mill, cement,
alkali recovery,
agriculture
Bagasse, molasses,
sludge, alcohol
residue, alkali,
ashes, filter mud
Spontaneous Private owners Environmental
regulations
addressing waste and
pollution in the sugar
industry; additional
revenues
Zhu and Coˆte´ (2004),
Zhu et al. (2007)
Ulsan, South
Korea
Oil, chemicals,
incineration, metal
processing, paper
mill
Wastewater, biogas,
steam, metal
Facilitated Korean Industrial
Complex
Corporation
Meet environmental
quality standards in
the region
Park and Won
(2007), Park et al.
(2008), Behera et al.
(2012), Park and
Park (2014), Park
et al. (2015)
Tianjin
Economic
Development
Area, China
Pharmaceuticals,
food and beverages,
electronics,
machinery
Water, metals,
chemical substances,
ash, slag, organic
residues
Facilitated Tianjin Economic
Development Area
Environmental
Protection Bureau
Environmental
regulations and cost
savings
Shi et al. (2010), Yu
et al. (2014)
Industrial
Areas, United
Kingdom
Coal-fired power
plant, oil refining,
plastic, rubber,
plastic recycling,
paper mill,
chemicals, food and
fish processing,
metals, furniture
Steam, electricity,
technology, waste
carpets, fuels, edible
oil, electronic waste
Facilitated National Industrial
Symbiosis
Programme
Landfill tax and
climate change levy
Mirata (2004),
Paquin and
Howard-Grenville
(2012), Paquin et al.
(2014)
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The progression of industrial symbiosis networks entails structural and
cultural embeddedness of a system of actors. In this system, social and busi-
ness relations are combined, and network ties enable the development of shared
norms that shape opportunities for collaboration, thus contributing to the
growth of the network (Chertow and Ehrenfeld 2012).
Finally, the business environment in which industrial symbiosis manifests
provides unique institutional conditions. Typically, an organizational unit is
associated with the institution of industrial symbiosis networks. The unit
offers an interface between firms, governmental bodies, and environmental
organizations, and also often comprises a team that supports the develop-
ment of synergies (Lowe 1997). The progression of industrial symbiosis net-
works is contingent on the organizational unit and the associated institution
because they facilitate network embeddedness, strengthen the alignment be-
tween business and regulations, and help to coordinate transactions (Cher-
tow and Ehrenfeld 2012). In other words, the organizational unit manages the
business environment, including its uncertainty, munificence, and complexity
(Arago´n-Correa and Sharma 2003), thereby contributing to the environmental
and the cooperative strategy of industrial symbiosis networks.
Consequently, we identify three dimensions of capabilities and resources
that are relevant for industrial symbiosis networks on the level of the firm, the
network, and the business environment: the proactive environmental stance
of individual firms, cooperative relationships that entail network embedded-
ness and strategic alliances, and a business environment in which industrial
symbiosis is institutionalized. We present the analysis of our data in Table 3.2
using these dimensions. Furthermore, we elaborate on our findings.
3.3.1 Individual firms – proactive environmental stance
The proactive environmental stance of firms implies seeking for innovative
opportunities at the business/natural environmental interface (Sharma and
Vredenburg 1998). This means that while firms are motivated to reduce waste
and prevent pollution, they are looking for alternative forms of recycling out-
side their supply chain (Bansal and McKnight 2009). However, industrial
symbiosis networks are often shaped by regulations that either directly ad-
dress pollution prevention or indirectly create pressure by increased disposal
or raw material costs.
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Table 3.2: Capabilities and resources identified in industrial symbiosis networks
Industrial
symbiosis
Individual firms – proactive
environmental stance
Cooperative relationships – alliances and
embeddedness
Business environment – institution and
organizational unit
Kalundborg,
Denmark
continuous and largescale by-product
streams; integration of community
perspectives on sustainable
development; local plants with
decision-making power
mutual interest in solving groundwater
deficit; flexible synergies in terms of
quality and quantity; historical social
relationships and local communication
ties; mutual trust in the problem-solving
process
effective ways of operationalizing ideas
based on synergies; environmental
legislation and initiatives to save energy
and water; flexible negation process
between authorities and firms;
institutionalized vision to make industry
more compatible with nature;
Kwinana,
Australia
secure availability and access to vital
process resources; awareness of
industrial operations and inputs and
outputs; integration of initiatives to
protect the sensitive local marine
environment
major capital projects involving
collective capacity expansion
opportunities;,historical supply chain
integration occurred between industries
prior to synergies
institutionalized form of air and water
monitoring for the industries; fostering
interactions between firms, government,
and the public community; obstructive
regulatory framework for using
by-products
Barceloneta,
Puerto Rico
shift to more in-facility reuse and
recycling, which led to a collapse of
sharing initiatives; fail to understand the
local context and implicit public
expectations
pooled needs and resources for waste
treatment; established familiarity and
trust; frequent interaction within the
pharmaceutical industry;
the organizational unit provides an
interface between governmental
agencies and industries; it also facilitates
interactions between firms and
institutionalizes cooperative resource
management
Styria, Austria various and stable waste supply and
demand as a result of divergent
production programs; technological
compatibility
mutual interest in waste recycling; easily
observable quality criteria; sufficient
number of potential partners; network
atmosphere encourages trust and
cooperation
firms are able to gain support from
environmental NGOs via
communication forums
Continued on next page
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Industrial
symbiosis
Individual firms – proactive
environmental stance
Cooperative relationships – alliances and
embeddedness
Business environment – institution and
organizational unit
Guitang Group,
China
life cycle thinking; supply chain
integration; developing its own
downstream companies to utilize nearly
all by-products; integration of sugarcane
farmers to stabilize supply
mutual interest with sugarcane farmers
in increasing supply stability; supply
chain actors share information and
establish cooperation; technology center
that developed techniques for
by-product utilization
effective coordination of communication
between enterprise units; close
relationship with the local government;
policies help to ensure a stable supply of
by-products (bagasse and molasses);
Ulsan EIP,
South Korea
continuously exploring synergistic
opportunities based on previous
experiences; increasing steam supply
and demand
collective interest in increasing
compatibility between operations;
historical synergistic and other supply
chain relationships
facilitate synergies with data and
feasibility studies, social network
establishment, and financial support;
effective negotiation process;
governmental subsidies; effective
communication between national
agencies
Tianjin
Economic
Development
Area, China
developing technological innovations
that use by-products as raw materials
(water reclamation system and new soil
sources); high demand on steam and hot
water
mutual interest in restoring soil fertility
around the industrial area;
disseminate information about industrial
symbiosis; effective coordination and
cooperation among different
administrative divisions; supportive
regulatory and economic instruments
Industrial
Areas, United
Kingdom
relative familiarity with one another’s
products and processes; issues with the
continuity of supplies; small businesses
are capable to transform their supply
chain
managers are willing to share
information and trust familiar partners
effective support for emerging synergies;
expertise in analyzing synergy
opportunities; connecting companies
with synergy opportunities; knowledge
base of firms in the region; governmental
subsidies
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Innovation is not necessarily radical in the sense that it is based on a set of
new engineering and scientific principles opening up whole newmarkets and
potential applications (Henderson and Clark 1990). Consequently, Henderson
and Clark argue that the so called architectural innovation only reconfigures
an established system by linking together existing components in new ways.
The environmental strategy pursued in industrial symbiosis is characterized
by a supply chain reconfiguration that connects (undesired) production out-
puts to material intake resulting in new material flows while eliminating oth-
ers.
Connecting previously unrelated industries through a pipeline infrastruc-
ture that transfers excess energy in the form of steam or warm water is a
typical form of industrial symbiosis. In Kalundborg, for example, the cen-
tral power plant supplies steam and heat to the nearby oil refinery, pharma-
ceutical company, and the local municipality reducing their electricity intake
(Jacobsen 2006). Furthermore, to reduce freshwater consumption, the power
plant in turn reuses the wastewater and cooling water output of the refinery.
The power plant in Kalundborg also opted for a desulfurization process
producing gypsum to meet environmental regulations because the adjacent
plasterboard manufacturer was ready to purchase this by-product (Jacobsen
and Anderberg 2004). Similarly, a pigment plant in Kwinana installed a sec-
ondary gas scrubber to maintain emission standards and produce an acid that
is a valuable material substitute for another chemical plant (van Beers et al.
2007).
Waste and by-products are also converted into a market offering to avoid
landfilling. The fly and bottom ash of power plants and incinerators, which
would typically be landfilled, is for example used in cement production, brick
and floor tile manufacturing, and in the production of organic fertilizers (e.g.
Schwarz and Steininger 1997, Shi et al. 2010). Residual biomass is also used
as organic fertilizer or converted to animal feed, thereby substituting (or com-
plementing) artificial fertilizers and other sources of fodder (Jacobsen 2006).
From a technological point of view, supply and demand security (both
quality and quantity) is vital for industrial symbiosis (Lowe 1997, Coˆte´ and
Smolenaars 1997). In Kalundborg, continuous and stable by-product sup-
ply and demand are found to be critical factors of success (Jacobsen and An-
derberg 2004). In the UK, issues with supply hindered industrial symbiosis
projects (Paquin et al. 2014). Furthermore, technological compatibility be-
tween by-products and material intake is also an essential criterion for indus-
trial symbiosis (Schwarz and Steininger 1997). However, modifying technical
parameters, for example, in case of steam networking practices, is sometimes
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necessary (Park and Park 2014).
In general, supply chain reconfiguration associated with synergistic trans-
actions requires dedicated management with decision making power. In Kal-
undborg, the success of initiating synergies is attributed to autonomous plant
managerswho have been committed to the local alternative use of by-products
and rawmaterial substitutes for decades (Jacobsen and Anderberg 2004). Fur-
thermore, it was found that smaller firms are capable to transform their busi-
ness and reconfigure their supply chains in a relatively short time (Lombardi
and Laybourn 2012). From a managerial perspective, reconfiguration requires
surveillance and learning of other industries, benchmarking of technological
alternatives, and the ability to accomplish the necessary internal and external
transformations (Teece et al. 1997).
The proactive stance towards recycling involving industrial symbiosis re-
quires an awareness that goes beyond the boundaries of the firm but still
remains within geographical boundaries. The resulting knowledge pool of
industrial operations and their associated material intake and outputs was
found to be useful in the initiation of synergies in Kwinana (van Beers et al.
2007). Similarly, relative familiarity with one another’s products and pro-
cesses was found to be necessary in the NISP (Paquin et al. 2014). Knowledge
about materials and wastes is often in the hands of employees who work next
to the industrial processes. Consequently, ideas concerning industrial sym-
biosis often comes from employees who push waste and by-product issues
higher up in the management hierarchy (Chertow and Ehrenfeld 2012).
In general, industrial symbiosis entails a cultural change, which has im-
plications on how firms see themselves as part of a system (Lombardi and
Laybourn 2012). This perspective integrates stakeholder perspectives and life
cycle thinking (i.e. “the voice of the environment” ) into strategic manage-
ment (Hart 1995). Consequently, firms often find further synergistic oppor-
tunities. Here, stakeholders are local suppliers and the local community of
people where industrial operations take place. The role of additional stake-
holders will be discussed later.
Responding to community expectations (and local governmental pressure)
regarding the management of the local air- and watersheds and the protection
of the sensitive marine environment was a dominant trigger for utility syn-
ergies in Kwinana (van Beers et al. 2007). The local chemical plant built an
innovative nutrient-stripping wetland to reduce nitrogen discharges into the
local bay. However, the idea of industrial symbiosis received negative pub-
licity in Barceloneta when the local water treatment service received public
complaints with regards to bad odors, respiratory ailments and pollution of
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the local marine environment (Ashton 2011). Further investigations revealed
poor testing, operational, and maintenance practices as primary causes. In
this case, firms and stakeholders had clearly non-congruent expectations re-
garding the environmental strategy.
Supply chain integration is another opportunity for industrial symbiosis.
The Guitang Group is an integrated enterprise that turns production to a
closed loop ecosystem by integrating pulp and paper, alkali recovery, cement,
and alcohol plants around sugar refining (Zhu and Coˆte´ 2004). The core com-
petence of the group is reflected in a life cycle perspective on its produc-
tion system. The group takes care of the by-products of its sugar production
(bagasse and molasses) and also the residues of the subsequent production
units. The group also integrates sugarcane farmers in the system by provid-
ing them a fertilizer made of alcohol residue. The advantage of the system is
its diverse product portfolio and the synergies between production units that
minimize waste disposal and reduce plantation costs of sugarcane (Zhu et al.
2007).
We conclude that firms in industrial symbiosis require stable and continu-
ous supply and demand of high-quality undesired production outputs within
relative geographical boundaries. Furthermore, we conclude that firms in in-
dustrial symbiosis draw on extensive employee involvement and tacit sup-
ply chain management skills, as well as on life cycle thinking and proactive
stakeholder management while finding suitable opportunities for by-product
reuse.
3.3.2 Cooperative relationships – strategic alliances and net-
work embeddedness
Firms in industrial symbiosis networks emphasize community relationships,
cooperation, and connectedness (Bansal andMcKnight 2009). In general, firms
that are embedded in the same social network (community) are likely to have
a shared understanding of certain issues and to develop a similar behavior
in responding to those issues (Gulati 1998). Additionally, familiarity between
partnering firms breeds trust around the norm of cooperation, and network
embeddedness provides firms with information about each other’s needs and
requirements (Gulati 1995, 1998). Consequently, the network in which firms
are embedded defines alliance opportunities (Gulati 1999).
Industrial symbiosis networks often emerge as result of facing natural re-
source scarcity in a certain region. For instance, in Kalundborg and Barceloneta,
companies facedwater deficits (Jacobsen 2006, Ashton 2011), companies in the
Tianjin Economic Development Area (TEDA), China, faced severe land degra-
3.3. Identification and analysis of capabilities and resources 61
dation (Shi et al. 2010), and in Styria, firms had mutual interest in solving
waste recycling (Schwarz and Steininger 1997). These issues were addressed
with joint action partly resulting in industrial symbiosis projects. Further-
more, in Kwinana, major capital projects served as a regional synergy driver
(van Beers et al. 2007). The new iron smelter in the area created opportunities
to source a number of inputs locally, such as lime kiln dust and wastewater,
and also provided outputs with potential reuse, such as slag and gypsum.
In general, strategic alliances require some degree of familiarity between
the partners (Gulati 1995, 1999). In Kwinana and Ulsan, for example, histori-
cal supply chain integration took place locally establishing social ties between
firms before the development of regional synergies (van Beers et al. 2007, Park
et al. 2008). In Barceloneta, the intra-industrial network of pharmaceutical
firms led to industrial symbiosis projects (Ashton 2008). In Kalundborg, how-
ever, structural embeddedness developed through regular community inter-
actions (Jacobsen and Anderberg 2004). In industrial symbiosis networks, em-
beddedness is described with a unique “atmosphere” and a “short mental dis-
tance” that associates with trust and shared norms of cooperation (Ehrenfeld
and Gertler 1997, Schwarz and Steininger 1997).
Cooperation in industrial symbiosis networks prompt firms to go beyond
market transactions andmake specific investments related to by-product reuse
and share knowledge (information and know-how) while seeking synergistic
opportunities. Consequently, inter-firm relation-specific assets are developed,
and firms become involved in inter-firm knowledge-sharing routines (Dyer
and Singh 1998).
In relation to synergistic projects, firms typically invest in treatment oper-
ations, infrastructure or facilities, capacity expansion, process improvement,
or product development. In Kalundborg, investments in the pipeline infras-
tructure and technical installations exhibit the cooperative nature of compa-
nies (Jacobsen 2006). Similarly, companies in Barceloneta, in Ulsan, and the
TEDA made joint investments in utility synergies including steam and water
exchanges (Shi et al. 2010, Behera et al. 2012, Ashton 2008).
Furthermore, industrial symbiosis networks take advantage of knowledge
transfer and integration because these are potential sources of innovation.
For example, the Guitang Group has a dedicated technology center that is in
collaboration with universities researching alternative by-products and new
ways of improving by-product utilization (Zhu et al. 2007). The group also
invested in synergy projects with other sugar refinery groups combining its
technological expertise with the others’ bagasse supplies (Zhu and Coˆte´ 2004).
In Kalundborg, symbiosis specific problem-solving routines are employed that
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provide effective ways of operationalizing project ideas (Jacobsen and Ander-
berg 2004).
However, the essence of partnerships in industrial symbiosis is comple-
mentarity between resources, which results in a synergistic effect whereby re-
sources (e.g., undesired production outputs) become more valuable than they
had been before they were combined (Dyer and Singh 1998). In a certain ge-
ographical proximity, this implies unique fit between firms which they take
advantage of (Bansal and McKnight 2009). Firms typically lose their interest
in industrial symbiosis if complementarity doesn’t longer exist. For example,
a firm may develop its in-house recovery process rendering its partner un-
necessary (Ashton 2009); a firm may find a more profitable way of using its
by-product or even eliminate by-products with cleaner production technolo-
gies (Shi et al. 2010).
Furthermore, synergistic relations define interdependency among firms.
In Kalundborg, increased interdependency did not lock-in firms to the re-
gion, instead the synergies have changed both in terms of quality and quan-
tity over the decades (Jacobsen and Anderberg 2004). However, interdepen-
dency is seen as a potential threat to industrial symbiosis networks: losing a
critical by-product supply or market can be disastrous for a firm and failure
can propagate through the network (Lowe 1997, Bansal and McKnight 2009).
Consequently, to overcome fragility, the Guitang Group aims to diversity in
its by-product portfolio and increase supply chain redundancy with multiple
bagasse suppliers (Zhu and Coˆte´ 2004). However, such increased resilience
leads to additional complexity and coordination challenges.
In relation to cooperation, we conclude that firms in industrial symbiosis
networks leverage familiarity and emphasize collective issues embedded in
their social network (community). Furthermore, firms in industrial symbiosis
networks draw on experience in complementary strategic alliances and on the
efficient management of interdependencies, as well as on symbiosis-specific
knowledge transfer routines.
3.3.3 Business environment – institutionalization and organi-
zational unit
One of the key features of industrial symbiosis is that firms are in a business
environment that supports the development of symbiotic relations (Bansal
and McKnight 2009). In fact, industrial symbiosis networks are more than
a number of actors engaging in dyadic waste relationships; there is a con-
scious recognition and intentional pursuit of network benefits combined with
an institutionalization of beliefs and norms enabling collaborative behavior
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(Chertow and Ehrenfeld 2012). In industrial symbiosis networks, institution-
alization often manifests in an organizational unit. Typically, the unit com-
prises firms and stakeholders including authorities, non-governmental orga-
nizations, and a recruiting team (Lowe 1997). In general, the institution es-
tablishes a supportive context and offers management services for the indus-
trial symbiosis network (Schwarz and Steininger 1997, Chertow and Ehrenfeld
2012)
Part of the institutional conditions relate to public authorities and a leg-
islative context that enables and drives industrial symbiosis. For example,
in Kalundborg, the flexible Danish environmental legislation facilitated local
problem solving (Jacobsen and Anderberg 2004). In the Guangxi region, envi-
ronmental legislation prohibits the disposal of bagasse andmolasses, and thus
encourages small sugar refineries to deliver these by-products to the Guitang
Group (Zhu and Coˆte´ 2004). However, obstructive regulations create a barrier
for industrial symbiosis. In Kwinana for example, firms experience difficulties
in getting governmental approval for alternative use of fuels and raw materi-
als (van Beers et al. 2007). In an effort to alleviate legislative complications, the
European Commission also recently proposed to clarify rules on by-products
to facilitate industrial symbiosis (EC 2015).
Furthermore, governments contribute to the development of industrial
symbiosis with financial instruments, such as disposal fees and subsidies. In
general, disposal costs are effective if they exceed the operational and trans-
action costs of industrial symbiosis. In fact, waste disposal costs are the most
common trigger of industrial symbiosis (Jacobsen 2006, Paquin and Howard-
Grenville 2012, Yu et al. 2014). Additionally, governmental subsidies also
incentivize industrial symbiosis. Typically, infrastructural developments in
centrally planned industrial symbiosis networks are subsidized (Behera et al.
2012, Paquin and Howard-Grenville 2012, Yu et al. 2014).
Generally speaking, the institutional structure, including regulations, dis-
posal costs, and subsidies, is contingent to industrial symbiosis. In other
words, the business environment supports the development of industrial sym-
biosis networks. However, besides governmental munificence, the general
business environment is also affected by organizational uncertainty and com-
plexity (Arago´n-Correa and Sharma 2003).
The institutionalization of industrial symbiosis reduces organizational un-
certainty and complexity in industrial symbiosis networks. For example, the
Symbiosis Institute in Kalundborg developed as collective sense of industries,
local authorities, and environmental agencies with a vision to make industry
more compatible with nature (Jacobsen and Anderberg 2004). As a result, a set
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of common values and beliefs have evolved, and the symbiosis projects were
taken to the level of multilateral cooperation. In Barceloneta, the Wastewater
Advisory Council became the institution of cooperative resource management
that engaged firms in industrial symbiosis
citepAshton.2011. Similarly, the Kwinana Industrial Council addresses issues
common to the industries in the region, and seeks to foster positive interaction
between firms, the government, and the broader community (van Beers et al.
2007).
The organizational unit facilitates industrial symbiosis networks by offer-
ing services that reduce the associated costs of industrial symbiosis. These ser-
vices typically include data collection and coordination tasks. Consequently,
the organizational unit increases the ability of the industrial symbiosis net-
work to accumulate, store, and diffuse symbiosis-specific information, such
as material flow data and waste legislations. Furthermore, coordination tasks
in relation to industrial symbiosis include social network establishment and
the effective management of transactions.
In centrally organized industrial symbiosis networks, data collection typ-
ically focuses on material flows within geographical boundaries, such as in-
dustrial districts and geographical regions. For example, the NISP collects
and analyses data about material flows in different regions in the UK (Paquin
and Howard-Grenville 2012). Similarly, in Korea and China, the organiza-
tional units collect information in industrial districts, such as the Ulsan eco-
industrial park and the TEDA (Behera et al. 2012, Shi et al. 2010). The point of
data collection is to analyze emissions, and identify feasible synergy opportu-
nities. Feasible opportunities are then further supported by the organizational
unit.
The coordination task in case of central organization often starts with facil-
itating social networking and connecting firms with potential synergies. En-
gaging firms in interaction is a challenge when firms are not aware of the
industrial symbiosis initiative (Park and Won 2007). Effective recruitment,
however, relies on boundary spanner personnel (project champions) who are
trusted by industry representatives, and have personal networks (Paquin et al.
2014).
Furthermore, effective management facilitates discourse between the in-
dustrial symbiosis network and the governments. For example, in the TEDA,
the administrative commission has been a lean interface between firms and
the local and national governments allowing effective coordination and co-
operation (Shi et al. 2010). Furthermore, transaction costs are mitigated by
the organizational unit. In Ulsan, for example, the administration offers a
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Figure 1 – Capabilities and resources relevant for the three managerial dimensions of industrial symbiosis networks
Figure 3.1: Capabilities and resources relevant for the three managerial di-
mensions of industrial symbiosis networks.
business framework and supports negotiation to ensure collective benefits to
participants (Behera et al. 2012).
In relation to the business environment, we conclude that institutionaliza-
tion creates a business context that supports industrial symbiosis with regula-
tory and financial instruments. Furthermore, the organizational unit reduces
uncertainty and complexity in the business environment of industrial sym-
biosis networks by engaging firms, providing symbiosis-specific information,
and effectively coordinating transactions.
Figure 3.1 concludes our findings about the key capabilities and resources
in industrial symbiosis networks.
3.4 Competitiveness in industrial symbiosis
Firms in industrial symbiosis capitalize on unique opportunities afforded by
geographical proximity, excess resources, and potentially useful wastes; con-
sequently, resulting in idiosyncratic supply networks (Bansal and McKnight
2009). Environmental strategies pursuing industrial symbiosis create value
by, for example, increasing resource productivity, generating revenue, reduc-
ing costs, and mitigating risk. Furthermore, a strategy based on industrial
symbiosis is arguably rare because of its uniqueness. Consequently, industrial
symbiosis generates competitive advantage.
Furthermore, industrial symbiosis is difficult to initiate and maintain due
to the tight integration among a diverse set of organizations (Bansal andMcK-
night 2009). We argue that industrial symbiosis networks are imperfectly im-
itable because of the combination of the previously identified capabilities and
resources that feed into supply chainmanagement (Barney 2012). We attribute
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these capabilities and resources to three dimensions: the proactive environ-
mental stance of the firm, the management of cooperative relationships, and
the business environment. In this section, we will now theorize how firms ob-
tain sustained competitive advantage during the initiation and progression of
industrial symbiosis networks.
3.4.1 Initiating industrial symbiosis
To initiate industrial symbiosis, firms need to challenge their established dis-
posal and procurement practices, learn about alternative material flows and
configurations, and set out to reconfigure part of their existing supply chains.
Firmsmay find business opportunities by learning about unsatisfied needs for
material flows in their surroundings that may be supplied with their own un-
desired production outputs. Likewise, through their insight in material flows
in the region, firms may also identify potential alternatives to their own in-
take of resources. Consequently, a firm that systematically aims to turn waste
to resource, surveys the market for opportunities, and has a willingness and
financial capacity to engage in new transactions is more likely to initiate in-
dustrial symbiosis.
In general, reconfiguration requires to go beyond existing communication
channels, information filters, and managerial routines (Henderson and Clark
1990). Firms that initiate industrial symbiosis have to engage in communica-
tion outside their core business activities. As a result, potential partners come
into the view of each other in a form of architectural knowledge of material
flows in their surroundings. Furthermore, it is necessary to allow undesired
production output related issues to filter into the level of strategic manage-
ment. Additionally, firms need to internalize the management of communica-
tion and information filters related to industrial symbiosis in order to become
effective in reconfiguration.
Similarly to other pollution prevention strategies, the initiation of indus-
trial symbiosis is people intensive (Hart 1995). It relies on skilled person-
nel that is able to integrate cross-functional knowledge, and dedicated man-
agement that brings new architectural knowledge into effective action. Fur-
thermore, it combines proactive environmental management capabilities with
supply chain reconfiguration. Therefore, the initiation of industrial symbiosis
is causally ambiguous (tacit) and is hence imperfectly imitable.
PROPOSITION 1. Firms that systematically aim to turn undesired production output
into a resource and invest in learning about material flows in their surroundings; fur-
thermore, possess the necessary financial resources, tacit knowledge, and managerial
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capabilities to reconfigure their supply chain obtain competitive advantage in indus-
trial symbiosis.
Implementing industrial symbiosis carries social challenges associatedwith
the personal relationships and technical challenges pertain to the quantity and
appropriate quality of industrial by-products (Bansal and McKnight 2009).
Consequently, those partners who trust each other and are able to secure by-
product supply and demand are more likely to initiate industrial symbiosis.
Strategic alliances often depend on a firm’s ability to find a partner with
a relational capability (i.e. a firm’s willingness and ability to partner) and
complementary strategic resources (Dyer and Singh 1998). In case of indus-
trial symbiosis, relational capabilities endow individuals in key positions to
start subject-oriented inter-firm dialogue, to develop and spread ideas, and
develop the skills to convince opponents (Schwarz and Steininger 1997, Ja-
cobsen and Anderberg 2004). However, network embeddedness, meaning
that potential partners know each other’s needs, requirements, and trustwor-
thiness, serves as a basis for those individuals. Therefore, the initiation of
industrial symbiosis is socially complex and thus difficult to imitate.
Technical challenges also need to be overcome. In general, firms with sta-
ble and continuous by-product supply or demand are more likely to be found
as a partner. Furthermore, a firm that is able to meet its partner’s quality
standards without (or with minimal) by-product treatment is more likely to
initiate industrial symbiosis because the anticipated coordination costs and
appropriation concerns are lower. For instance, it is easier to find a partner for
fly ash without metal contaminants. However, uneven quality of by-products
could cause damage to equipment or quality of products (Lowe 1997).
Residual disposal or procurement costs occur if there is a mismatch in
by-product supply-demand. In this case, partners face additional transac-
tion costs for procuring the remaining raw materials and/or for disposing
by-product leftovers. Consequently, matching by-product supply-demand in
industrial symbiosis is valuable and also imperfectly imitable because of part-
ner scarcity in close geographical proximity.
PROPOSITION 2. Firms with managers that have relational capabilities to engage
other firms in by-product transactions have competitive advantage in industrial sym-
biosis. Furthermore, by-product transactions based on high-quality production out-
puts and with matching supply and demand obtain competitive advantage.
The degree to which the general business environment supports proactive
environmental strategies is contingent to industrial symbiosis (Arago´n-Correa
and Sharma 2003). Regulations regarding waste reuse allowance or subsidiza-
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tion have a critical role in the initiation of industrial symbiosis, while busi-
ness environments where waste reuse is regulated typically inhibits industrial
symbiosis. Additionally, local communities and external stakeholders are de-
manding companies to become more visible and transparent (Freeman 1984,
Hart 1995). Information disclosure about undesired production outputs is also
necessary to learn about synergistic opportunities. In general, the organiza-
tional unit offers a communication platform between firms and governments,
supporting the business environment.
Furthermore, industrial symbiosis is contingent upon certainty in the busi-
ness environment. Organizational effect uncertainty arises from a lack of or-
ganizational capabilities and resources and generally inhibits proactive envi-
ronmental strategies (Arago´n-Correa and Sharma 2003). However, the orga-
nizational unit of industrial symbiosis mitigates this uncertainty by institu-
tionalizing cooperation and coordination between firms and external stake-
holders. The organizational unit embodies a sense of community in terms of
a general attitude towards economic and environmental development. Addi-
tionally, the organizational unit often offers managerial routines for material
flow mapping, feasibility studies, and matchmaking for companies that are in
a lack of these capabilities, and also ensures rules and principles for coopera-
tion that reduce the associated cost of initiating industrial symbiosis.
In general, the institutional business environment that is able to control op-
portunism and encourage cooperative behavior is socially complex (Dyer and
Singh 1998). Consequently, the business environment of industrial symbiosis
is difficult to imitate.
PROPOSITION 3. In a business environment that supports the reuse of production
outputs with regulatory and financial instruments, firms are more likely to initiate
industrial symbiosis. Furthermore, firms that support an organizational unit where
the norms of cooperation are institutionalized and they can have discourse with au-
thorities obtain competitive advantage.
3.4.2 Progressing industrial symbiosis
Research found that industrial symbiosis networks that persist move in the di-
rection of environmental sustainability (Chertow and Ehrenfeld 2012). How-
ever, a synergy is not good in itself if the technology upstream is not sus-
tainable (Lowe 1997). For example, a fossil fuel-based power plant providing
steam to an oil refinery is still contributing to the depletion of non-renewable
resources (coal, oil and natural gas) upstream (Mirata 2004). Moreover, syner-
gistic transactions could lock in continued reliance on toxic materials and on
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unsustainable technologies (Lowe 1997). In other words, an industrial sym-
biosis that has short-term financial gains can turn out to be a competitive dis-
advantage in the future.
In general, firms that engage in industrial symbiosis benefit from life cy-
cle thinking and stakeholder integration. However, these capabilities require
socially complex resources, involving fluid communication across functions,
departments, and organizational boundaries (Hart 1995). Consequently, inte-
grated enterprises, such as the Guitang Group, have competitive advantage
because management is able to gradually expand and coordinate the indus-
trial symbiosis network effectively emphasizing the entire life cycle of pro-
duction.
Furthermore, a proactive environmental strategy that is supposed to ex-
clude toxic materials and minimize the use of nonrenewable resources also
needs to use renewable resources in accordance with their rate of replenish-
ment (Hart 1995). Competitive advantage can be achieved by gaining pre-
ferred or exclusive access to important, but limited resources (Hart 1995).
Consequently, firms in industrial symbiosis can preempt competition by tap-
ping into by-product supply or demand and fully utilize what is available.
In industrial symbiosis, this first-mover advantage can be completed while
progressing toward matching supply and demand.
PROPOSITION 4. Firms that have the organizational ability to coordinate functional
groups within the firm and to integrate the perspectives of stakeholders have competi-
tive advantage in industrial symbiosis. Furthermore, firms that secure their exclusive
access to by-product supply or demand obtain competitive advantage in industrial
symbiosis.
Firms in synergistic relations face interdependencies that create challenges.
However, interdependencies can also be a source of competitive advantage.
One way to increase imperfect imitability of a relationship is to increase the
proportion of synergy sensitive resources (Dyer and Singh 1998). For exam-
ple, in Ulsan, a chemical company increased its steam consumption capac-
ity by building additional plants, while a partnering incinerator changed its
boiler design to be able to produce high pressure steam to the plants (Park
and Park 2014). The chemical plant showed substantial interest to tap into all
available steam resources in its area, and the incinerator exhibited increased
flexibility in providing a market offering. The two firms gradually deployed
the expansions creating conditions that made subsequent, specialized invest-
ments economically viable. The resulting enhanced inter-organizational asset
interconnectedness is imperfectly imitable because its full potential lies in a
bundle of investments (Dyer and Singh 1998).
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In industrial symbiosis, relations can be a source of knowledge transfer
and integration. In general, the ability to exploit outside source of knowledge
is a function of prior related knowledge. Partner-specific absorptive capac-
ity is a firm’s ability to recognize and assimilate valuable knowledge from
a particular alliance partner (Dyer and Singh 1998). In industrial symbiosis,
firms are able to develop partner-specific absorptive capacity by emphasiz-
ing symbiosis-specific knowledge transfer and integration routines. Conse-
quently, firms extend their overlapping knowledge base and increase the like-
lihood to identify additional synergy opportunities. For example, in Kalund-
borg, high level absorptive capacity of the firms enables collaboration on new
technological solutions within the framework of industrial symbiosis. In gen-
eral, partner-specific absorptive capacity is imperfectly imitable because it is
relation-specific and evolves over time (Dyer and Singh 1998).
PROPOSITION 5. Firms that increase the proportion of synergy-sensitive resources
and/or operations in synergistic relations obtain competitive advantage. Furthermore,
firms that develop partner-specific knowledge absorption capacity in synergistic rela-
tions obtain competitive advantage.
The progression of industrial symbiosis networks entails broader by-prod-
uct markets. These larger networks will give greater resilience to the pattern
of trades; however, their complexity raises with the increasing number and
diversity of members (Lowe 1997). As a result, coordination challenges are
intensified both in terms of collective effort to environmental sustainability
and managing transactions. Ideally, in larger industrial symbiosis networks a
dedicated team in the organizational unit takes care of coordination.
The organizational unit needs to have a clear vision, as well as environ-
mental and community values and performance objectives that consider the
resources and boundaries of the network (Lowe 1997). In fact, sustainable de-
velopment requires a shared vision and consensus about low-impact technolo-
gies (Hart 1995). Consequently, to deliver performance, the organizational
team has to be able to communicate environmental and community values,
and to engage companies in pursuing the vision of sustainability. However,
collective dedication to a shared vision in relation to sustainability is difficult
to achieve in complex business environments (Arago´n-Correa and Sharma
2003). In other words, the collective effort to environmental sustainability and
thus the progression of industrial symbiosis networks is a socially complex
task that is specific to the individual networks.
The other coordination task of the organizational unit, managing transac-
tions in the industrial symbiosis network, includes filling critical supply and
demand niches while ensuring consensus among the members regarding mu-
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tual benefits (Lowe 1997). Large industrial systems typically consist of a di-
verse and dynamic set of firms. Therefore, an industrial symbiosis network
needs flexible management in order to include the various production out-
puts of industrial systems. Furthermore, continuously filling supply and de-
mand also requires a certain amount of redundancy in particular when small
firms with inconsistent production are involved. However, collective benefits
shared among networkmembers potentially harm individuals. Consequently,
a notion of fairness has to be established. In general, managing diversity and
redundancy, and ensuring mutual benefits are socially complex, and require
tacit (causally ambiguous) managerial skills.
PROPOSITION 6. In industrial symbiosis networks, an organizational unit that com-
municates environmental and community values, and develops consensus about low
impact-technologies reduces complexity and facilitates progress. Furthermore, in in-
dustrial symbiosis networks where diversity and redundancy is managed effectively
and fair benefits are ensured firms obtain competitive advantage.
3.5 Conclusion
Industrial symbiosis is a supply chain strategy based on cooperative relation-
ships that connect the supply of undesired production outputs with unsat-
isfied needs for material flows. The resulting synergies reduce waste dis-
posal and virgin material intake, and it is a key feature of industrial ecosys-
tems (Frosch and Gallopoulos 1989). Industrial symbiosis is a network phe-
nomenon emphasizing community, connectedness, and collaboration within
geographical proximity (Bansal and McKnight 2009). More importantly, there
is competitive advantage attributed to industrial symbiosis relations reflected
in increased productivity, innovative product or process changes, increasing
revenue, diversifying business, and managing risk (Porter and van der Linde
1995, Lombardi and Laybourn 2012). There are significant environmental and
community-related benefits attributed to industrial symbiosis; however, the
attributed competitive advantage is what makes it attractive for most busi-
nesses (Chertow 2000).
This paper contributes toward a theory of competitiveness in industrial
symbiosis in order to provide theoretical grounding for the previous argu-
ments concerning competitive advantage. To do so, the paper presents a
resource-based view of industrial symbiosis and the related supply chain phe-
nomenon. To be able to include the level of the firm, the network, and the
business environment, three extensions of the general resource-based view are
used: the natural-resource-based view of the firm (Hart 1995, Hart and Dowell
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2011), the relational view (Dyer and Singh 1998), and the contingent resource-
based view (Arago´n-Correa and Sharma 2003). The paper draws on eight
published cases of industrial symbiosis networks worldwide, to inductively
build theory from existing cases (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007). The selected
cases have also been surveyed recently by other researchers for developing
theory on industrial symbiosis (Chertow and Ehrenfeld 2012). Therefore, they
are believed to represent the features of industrial symbiosis, and to form a
solid basis for this particular research.
The first contribution of the paper is the identification of key organiza-
tional capabilities and resources relevant in industrial symbiosis. In fact, three
dimensions are identified: the proactive environmental stance of individual
firms; the cooperative relationships, including strategic alliances and network
embeddedness; and the general business environment, including institution-
alization and an organizational unit that are contingent to industrial symbio-
sis. Consequently, it is suggested that industrial symbiosis networks entail
firm-specific and relation-specific capabilities and resources that are moder-
ated by capabilities and resources present in the business environment.
The second contribution of the paper is its elaboration on how firms may
obtain sustained competitive advantage in industrial symbiosis. The paper
considers initiation and progression as two distinct stages of industrial sym-
biosis networks. Furthermore, it incorporates the previously identified di-
mensions of capabilities and resources. It theorizes that industrial symbiosis
networks are difficult to imitate because initiation draws on tacit personnel
skills, faces partner scarcity, and involves institutionalization; and progression
requires life cycle thinking, inter-organizational asset interconnectedness, and
an organizational unit that coordinates the sustainability effort and the trans-
actions in the network. The findings are expressed in six propositions that
constitute the basis for a theory of competitiveness in industrial symbiosis
networks.
In conclusion, this paper contributes toward a theory of industrial sym-
biosis from a management point of view. However, the resource-based view
used in this paper combining three managerial dimensions can also be a use-
ful tool for future researchers studying other supply chain or network phe-
nomena. Furthermore, the results have significant managerial implications
because they emphasize important capabilities and resources for sustainable
development, and they suggest practicalities for obtaining competitive advan-
tage in industrial symbiosis networks. Future research, however, should test
these propositions.
CHAPTER 4
Fair resource allocation strategies
This chapter is based on a manuscript to be submitted for publication under the ti-
tle “The price of fairness in industrial symbiosis networks”. The manuscript is co-
authored by Ga´bor Herczeg and Renzo Akkerman.
Abstract
In this paper we address collaborative efforts in by-product synergies as
seen in industrial symbiosis networks. We propose a mathematical frame-
work tomodel fair resource allocations formultiple, concurrent by-product
suppliers with limited by-product demand. We analyze the price of fair-
ness resulting from different gain-based and loss-based allocation strate-
gies. We find that these allocation strategies are lead to different require-
ments in terms of information sharing, and show how the resulting price
of fairness depends on characteristics of the by-product synergy system.
Furthermore, we find that while allocation strategies based on equal and
equal marginal profits and costs motivate collaboration, strategies based
on proportionality reward individualistic behavior.
4.1 Introduction
The efficient use of natural resources is a key part of sustainable development.
The reuse of industrial waste and by-products offers opportunities to reduce
raw material consumption and avoid the consequences of disposal. When
performed across company borders, such reuse activities are referred to as in-
dustrial symbiosis. Industrial symbiosis is recognized and promoted as an im-
portant tool for sustainable development. For instance, the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) includes industrial sym-
biosis in their discussion of eco-innovation, i.e. new ways of addressing envi-
ronmental problems and decreasing energy and resource consumption, while
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promoting sustainable economic activity (OECD 2012). The European Com-
mission shares this perspective, and attributes key importance to industrial
symbiosis in achieving resource-efficient circular material flows in Europe (EC
2011, 2015). At the same time, the knowledge base to support businesses
and policy makers in these developments is limited, and more information
is needed to be able to make informed decisions (EEA 2016).
The idea of industrial ecosystems as a strategy for manufacturing was
identified by Frosch andGallopoulos (1989), and has lead to significant discus-
sion of the industrial symbiosis phenomenon in the industrial ecology com-
munity. In recent years, industrial symbiosis and related concepts also started
receiving attention in the operations management community (Bansal and
McKnight 2009, Lee 2012), where it can be characterized by a network of col-
laborating organizations based on by-product flows (Bansal and McKnight
2009). Matching the supply and demand of these by-products, however, can
be challenging since they are side effects of other production activities. Con-
sequently, demand and supply mismatches are common, leading to the dis-
posal of excess by-product and the procurement of supplementary virgin raw
materials. Also, it can lead to the identification of additional uses for by-
products, or the sourcing of by-products from multiple sources (e.g. Schwarz
and Steininger 1997, Zhu and Coˆte´ 2004).
In this paper, we specifically focus on the use of by-products from mul-
tiple sources. Next to a way to avoid mismatches in supply and demand,
concurrent by-product reuse is also an operational strategy to increase sup-
ply resilience, since the discontinuation of a certain by-product flow in in-
dustrial symbiosis networks could otherwise lead to critical supply problems
(Lowe 1997). The management of by-product supply from multiple, concur-
rent sources can however lead to a resource allocation problem, in which the
limited by-product demand has to be allocated to the suppliers. Since a fair
distribution of costs and benefits from by-product reuse is a key characteristic
of industrial symbiosis (Lombardi and Laybourn 2012), the demand alloca-
tion needs to include fairness considerations. Here, we need to realize that
“fair” does not necessarily mean equal (Benkler 2011), and that fairness nor-
mally comes at a cost, which is the trade-off for emphasizing collective gains
or losses instead of an economically optimal allocation (Bertsimas et al. 2011).
Industrial symbiosis initiatives are often supported by amatchmaking bro-
ker or a central organizational unit. Activities of such supporting organi-
zations involve matchmaking of symbiotic relationships and mediating by-
product supply and demand, and therefore also have to consider collective
economic incentives for the participants in order to engage them in collab-
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oration (Lowe 1997). This also includes the consideration of resilience and
fairness in the industrial symbiosis network.
The aim of this paper is to study the consideration of fairness in concurrent
by-product reuse in industrial symbiosis networks. We introduce a minimal
formal model of an industrial symbiosis network, allowing us to easily derive
the by-product allocations and the price of fairness for allocation strategies
with different fairness considerations. More importantly, we use these basic
analytical results to provide insights on requirements and consequences of en-
gagement in the considered industrial symbiosis network under the different
fairness considerations. This includes the identification of the allocation strat-
egy with the lowest price of fairness, the information sharing requirements
for the different strategies, as well as the incentives that suppliers have in
the resulting situation to reduce waste, increase reuse efficiency, or to share
technological advantages. The results and discussion lead to insights that are
relevant for companies collaborating in industrial symbiosis, as well as for
supporting organizations and policy makers.
In the following, we first briefly discuss related literature, after which we
introduce our model of a by-product reuse system with two concurrent sup-
pliers and one buyer. We then derive analytical expressions for the alloca-
tion quantities and the price of fairness for several fairness-oriented allocation
strategies. We then use these results in a comprehensive numerical study, fol-
lowed by a discussion section focusing on the implications of the analytical
and numerical results. Finally, we conclude our paper, discuss the limitations
of our study, and provide directions for further research.
4.2 Related literature
The paper draws on several streams of academic literature. First, our work
builds on research that deals with the operations management aspects of in-
dustrial symbiosis. Secondly, our work relates to resource allocation and the
impact of fairness considerations. In the following, we briefly discuss these
two streams of literature.
4.2.1 Industrial symbiosis in operations management
By-products occur in production systems, especially in process industries where
divergent product streams are common. In general, by-products have low
economic value and may need to undergo additional treatment in order to be
sold or reused (Flapper et al. 2002). In many cases, by-products are therefore
disposed of, but they are also used as alternative raw materials for an end
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product or in the production of new end products (French and LaForge 2006).
This reuse phenomenon is also referred to as by-product synergy (Chertow
2000, Lee 2012).
In industrial symbiosis, by-products are procured from external source(s)
and the transactions engage companies in a specific kind of buyer-supplier
interdependency (Bansal and McKnight 2009). Input-output matchmaking
services bring people and organizations together to stimulate participation,
help to identify by-product synergy opportunities, and initiate and coordi-
nate activities (van Beers et al. 2007, Chertow 2007). A matchmaking broker
(mediator) finds complementary by-product supply and demand, for exam-
ple through pooling by-product suppliers to create flows sufficient to market,
and maintains the cohesion of a broader synergy system (Lowe 1997, Paquin
and Howard-Grenville 2012). Here, two major challenges are to meet qual-
ity and quantity expectations in the by-product transaction, which typically is
organizationally subordinate to the primary production activities (Bansal and
McKnight 2009).
According to Lowe (1997), industrial ecosystems built on symbiotic rela-
tionships are subject to failure of critical synergies. Researchers also argue that
a broader by-product market gives resilience to the synergies, maintaining al-
ternative suppliers and buyers to step in when business conditions change
(Lowe 1997, Zhu and Coˆte´ 2004, Paquin and Howard-Grenville 2012). How-
ever, Zhu and Coˆte´ (2004) point out that increasing the number of suppliers
and buyers also raises supply chain barriers as it comes with organizational
complexity and potentially higher costs. This can lead to a too high efficiency
loss (Pettit and Fiksel 2010).
From an operations management perspective, designing a resilient supply
chain reduces risk of failure associated with supply and demand disturbances
(Christopher and Peck 2004, Pettit and Fiksel 2010). An increased supplier
base increases flexibility and reduces the risk of supply chain disturbances
(Ju¨ttner et al. 2003). On the other hand, the excess capacity conflicts with an
efficiency focus (Ju¨ttner et al. 2003). Pettit and Fiksel (2010) proposed that sup-
ply chain performance improves when capabilities and the actual vulnerabil-
ities to risks are more balanced. In short, supply chain redundancy improves
resilience, but after a certain level it is unjustified.
Interdependency, supply and demand disturbances, as well as market gr-
owth and product criticality motivate supply chain collaboration (de Leeuw
and Fransoo 2009). de Leeuw and Fransoo (2009) also point out that sup-
ply chain collaboration is characterized by aspects such as long-term business
relationships, common objectives, and cooperation (e.g., information sharing
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and joint operations management). Such collaborative approaches are by def-
inition present in (regional) industrial ecosystems, which are communities of
businesses that collaborate with each other to efficiently share resources (e.g.,
information, technologies, utilities, materials, institutions), leading to collec-
tive, equitable gains and increased employment (Lambert and Boons 2002,
Baas and Boons 2004). Accordingly, Lombardi and Laybourn (2012) argue
that industrial symbiosis must provide fair, but not necessarily equal benefits
for the participating companies.
It is clear that industrial symbiosis coordination aims to efficiently match
by-product supply and demand, while also creating a resilient synergy sys-
tem. In this respect, the effective allocation of by-products between multiple
and concurrent suppliers and buyers is an important consideration. It man-
ages resilience and ensures collective economic incentives for the participating
companies as well as prospect for future growth of by-product utilization.
4.2.2 Resource allocation and fairness
Resource allocation has been studied extensively, also in relation to fairness
considerations. Most work has its origins in the economic concepts of justice
and equity in cooperative settings (Rawls 1999), as well as psychological work
on self-interest and altruism (Rabin 1993).
With regards to operations and supply chain management, fairness is of-
ten considered in supply chain collaboration (Stadtler 2009). Important ap-
plications can be found in the allocation of bandwidth in communications
networks (Kelly et al. 1998), and in a manufacturer’s allocation of a limited
supply of products to retailers (Kumar et al. 1995). Fair resource allocation
can be based on different approaches. It requires some kind of fairness mea-
sure, which is mostly related to gains or losses, i.e. profits or costs (Hougaard
2009, Stadtler 2009). Here, sharing losses could also be considered reducing
unfairness.
Various allocation rules have been developed and studied over the years,
often based on order sizes or past sales (Hall and Liu 2008). In fact, a plethora
of fairness principles regarding resource allocation has been proposed in the
operations literature and been recently reviewed by Bertsimas et al. (2011).
Generally, allocation rules require an understanding of what is considered fair,
often linked to equality or proportionality to some other system characteristic
(Cachon and Lariviere 1999, Harks and Miller 2011).
In order to employ fair resource allocation, information about the suppli-
ers’ available quantities and their cost structures needs to be incorporated in
the fairness strategies (Stadtler 2009). There might be information asymme-
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try between the supply chain members, and the establishment of an efficient
or fair allocation might depend on information sharing (Li 2002). Usually,
the fairness is considered by a central decision maker or a mediator, who
should then also posses the necessary information (Stadtler 2009, Bertsimas
et al. 2011).
A common characteristic of introducing fairness in resource allocation is
that the resulting allocation leads to some kind of efficiency loss. This is the
difference between the maximum system efficiency and the efficiency under
a fair allocation (Bertsimas et al. 2011). In case of multiple suppliers, this
trade-off is relevant when one supply chain is more efficient and economi-
cally favourable compared to the other. This economic trade-off is referred to
as the price of fairness, as introduced by Bertsimas et al. (2011). The price of
fairness is normally expressed as a percentage efficiency loss compared to the
optimal (economic) efficiency of the system (Bertsimas et al. 2012).
As Tijs andDriessen (1986) already pointed out, there is no final best alloca-
tion, as this depends too much on the context in which the allocation problem
arises. However, for the specific context of industrial symbiosis, we are able
to provide insights on the performance of various resource allocation rules,
especially in relation to their price of fairness.
To be able to do this, we develop a framework for a by-product synergy
system with two concurrent suppliers. Furthermore, we take the perspective
of a broker (mediator) who is entitled to propose allocation rules resulting in
fair gains or losses in the by-product synergy system.
4.3 Concurrent by-product reuse
In this paper, we study three independent companies involved in an industrial
symbiosis network. We assume that there are two suppliers that have a similar
industrial by-product, and a user that is able to use either by-product supply
to substitute a rawmaterial. In an industrial symbiosis networkwithmultiple,
concurrent suppliers, the limited by-product demand is a “scarce resource”
that needs to be allocated to the different suppliers. Furthermore, by-product
leftover (i.e. surplus) still needs to be disposed of. Figure 4.1 illustrates the
system and the notation that we will introduce in the following.
ASSUMPTION 1. The industrial symbiosis network consists of concurrent suppliers
with a total by-product supply that is more than the demand (D)1, leading to a surplus
ratio of by-products,  . The total by-product supply is thus q1 + q2 = D(1 +  ).
1For a by-product supply less than the demand, allocation would be trivial.
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Supplier 1 (q1)
Supplier 2 (q2)
User (D)
Disposal (!1; !2)
(x1; b1)
(q1   x1)
(x2; b2)
(q2   x2)
By-product 1
By-product 2
Figure 4.1: Overview of the industrial symbiosis network.
We denote the supply quantities of by-product available at the suppliers
byq1 and q2, and the demand quantity of the user by D. We use the variables
xi to denote a specific allocation of by-product from supplier i to the user.
Due to the surplus in the system, we have x1 + x2 = D, x1  q1, and x2  q2.
We also introduce supplier i’s proportion of the total supply ri, leading to the
following relationship:
qi = riD(1 +  ). (4.1)
Note that in our two-supplier situation, a supplier’s proportion to the total
supply determines the other supplier’s proportion that is r1 = 1  r2.
After the allocation, supplier i still faces disposal costs for qi   xi by-
products, which for instance consists of the transportation and handling cost
required in getting the by-product to a disposal site, as well as a possible dis-
posal fee (e.g., landfill tax, incineration tax).
ASSUMPTION 2. Disposal costs are linear and proportional to the amount of by-
products disposed, represented in a disposal cost factor !i for each unit of by-product
disposed. Without by-product reuse in the industrial symbiosis network, supplier i
faces the following disposal costs:
ai = !iqi. (4.2)
The literature on allocation and fairness generally distinguishes between
gain-based and loss-based approaches (Hougaard 2009), which we follow in
our work. Generally, industrial symbiosis leads to direct economic gains by
saving disposal and raw material costs. Reduced costs translate into extra
profit, depending on the operational efficiency of the synergetic relationships.
Operations related to industrial symbiosis include supply chain activities such
as collection, transportation and treatment (Bansal andMcKnight 2009). More-
over, by-product reuse requires additional setups, testing, and storage (Flap-
per et al. 2002), as well as coordination efforts (Zhu and Coˆte´ 2004). Different
by-product supplier-buyer relationships can therefore have different cost pro-
files, depending on the operations and coordination efforts. In other words,
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concurrent by-product synergies in an industrial symbiosis network are not
always equally efficient.
ASSUMPTION 3. Operational costs of by-product reuse ( i) are linear and propor-
tional to the amount of by-product reused. Furthermore, the parameter bi repre-
sents the operational efficiency, i.e. how operational costs relate to disposal costs:
bi = !i    i, bi > 0.
ASSUMPTION 4. Without loss of generality: b1 > b2, meaning that by-product reuse
from supplier 1 is more efficient than from supplier 2.2
For the gain-based allocation approach, we consider the profit (i.e. cost
saving) that is made by reusing by-products.
ASSUMPTION 5. The profit generated by reusing by-products from supplier i is a
linear increasing function of the allocated supply xi with slope bi:
pi = bixi. (4.3)
The above profit structure is relevant for all gain-based allocations, where
the profit is made on the level of the synergetic relationship. For the loss-
based approach, only costs need to be considered. Here, by-product reuse
reduces disposal costs; however, the by-product surplus still needs to be dis-
posed of. In our paper, we therefore consider the disposal costs of remaining
by-products as the costs for the loss-based approach.
ASSUMPTION 6. The residual cost of supplier i is a linearly decreasing function of
the allocated supply xi with slope  bi and intercept ai:
ci = ai   bixi, (4.4)
Within the framework described above, efficiency is achieved by either
maximizing the total profits in the system or minimizing the total (residual)
costs. These are expressed with objective functions (4.3) and (4.4):
P ⇤(xi) = max
X
i
pi = max
X
i
bixi, (4.5)
C⇤(xi) = min
X
i
ci = min
 X
i
ai  
X
i
bixi
!
. (4.6)
However, the system efficiency resulting from (4.3) or (4.4) might not al-
ways be the best solution. It has the potential to make one of the concur-
rent suppliers less competitive, and might thereby negatively influence the
2For equal efficiencies, the system would not have a loss of efficiency due to the fairness con-
sideration, and there would not be a price of fairness.
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resilience achieved by having multiple suppliers. In theis paper, we therefore
specifically focus on fair allocation of economic gains (or losses).
ASSUMPTION 7. In concurrent by-product reuse in industrial symbiosis networks,
fair allocation ensures collective economic incentives to assure long-term resilience.
With the abstract system depicted in Figure 4.1, we provide a simplemodel
of the economic potential of concurrent by-product reuse in industrial sym-
biosis networks. We do however not explicitly consider possible payments
between suppliers and the buyer; how exactly profits or costs are distributed
among the symbiosis participants is out of the scope of this paper. We aim
focus on the overall system behavior where we use the individual synergetic
relationships as the unit of analysis. In the following, we use the specific sup-
plier to identify the specific synergetic relationship in the industrial symbiosis
network, since this is the key distinguishing feature. It should however be
noted that the efficiency attributed to a supplier then also includes the opera-
tional and organizational relationship with the buyer.
4.4 Fairness in by-product reuse
Optimal efficiency in concurrent by-product reuse is achieved when the more
efficient supplier is fully utilized. In equation (4.5) and (4.6), this implies x1 =
min(q1, D) and, consequently, x2 = min(D   q1, 0).
PROPOSITION 7. In concurrent by-product reuse in industrial symbiosis networks,
optimal performance is achieved when the more efficient supplier is fully utilized. In
case of the gain- and loss-based approach this implies, respectively:
P ⇤(x1, x2) = b1min(q1, D) + b2max(D   q1, 0),
C⇤(x1, x2) = a1 + a2   b1min(q1, D)  b2max(D   q1, 0).
For the analysis of fairness, we selected various allocation strategies: one
equality-based strategy and two proportionality-based strategies for both gain-
based and loss-based approach (presented in Figure 4.2). First, we consider
the most basic strategy of equal profits (costs). Secondly, we use a strategy
based on the Nash standard of comparison, which is the percentage change
in profit (cost) when it is allocated a small additional amount of supply. Ac-
cording to the principle of the Nash equilibrium, a reallocation of demand
between two suppliers is justified if the resulting marginal benefit of one sup-
plier is more than the resulting marginal detriment of the other supplier (see
also Bertsimas et al. 2012). Finally, we consider the maximum potential profits
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Equal Profits
Strategy (EPS)
Equal Marginal Prof-
its Strategy (MPS)
Proportional Prof-
its Strategy (PPS)
Gain-based
approach
Loss-based
approach
Equal Costs
Strategy (ECS)
Equal Marginal Costs
Strategy (MCS)
Proportional Costs
Strategy (PCS)
Figure 4.2: Fairness strategies identified in the literature and applied on the
industrial symbiosis network.
(minimum potential costs) of the suppliers and based on these, we derive a
proportional allocation that ensures that the proportion of the actual profits
(costs) and the maximum profits (minimum costs) are equal.
The strategies ensure fair profits (costs) by constraining equilibria (i.e. fair-
ness rule) in the allocation of by-product demand to the suppliers (x1, x2) in
specific ways. In the following, we utilize the fact that x2 = D   x1 in combi-
nation with the respective fairness rules to derive the resulting optimal allo-
cations (x⇤1, x⇤2) as well as the corresponding price of fairness.
4.4.1 Gain-based approach
One way to be fair is to ensure equally profitable by-product synergies. The
equal profit strategy (EPS) has the following fairness rule:
b1x1 = b2x2. (4.7)
The first row of Table 4.1 concludes the roots (x⇤1, x⇤2) and the feasible quantity
ranges of the EPS; equal profits cannot be assured when the maximum profit
of one supplier is less than the minimum profit of the other supplier.
The equal marginal profit strategy (MPS) focuses on the marginal profit of
a synergy that is gained when a small amount ✏ of by-products is added to
the already allocated amounts. The comparison of marginal profits resembles
the Nash equilibrium also used by Bertsimas et al. (2011). The MPS ensures
equilibrium between the marginal profits of the suppliers with the following
fairness rule:
✏b1
b1x1
=
✏b2
b2x2
. (4.8)
The roots of the MPS are expressed in the second row of Table 4.1. Based on
equation (4.8), the MPS ensures an equal allocation (x1 = x2) of half of the
demand, which is only feasible if both suppliers can cover at least half of the
demand.
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Strategy x⇤1 x⇤2 Feasible range
EPS b2Db1+b2
b1D
b1+b2
q1   b2Db1+b2 ; q2   b1Db1+b2
MPS D2
D
2 q1   D2 ; q2   D2
PPS
q1D
q1+q2
q2D
q1+q2
q1 < D; q2 < D
q1D
q1+D
D2
q1+D
q1 < D; q2   D
D
2
D
2 q1   D; q2   D
D2
q2+D
q2D
q2+D
q1   D; q2 < D
Table 4.1: By-product allocation and feasibility of fairness strategies with gain-
based approach
Finally, the proportional profits strategy (PPS) ensures that the ratio of the
actual profit and the potential maximum profit is the same for both suppliers.
The mathematical formulation of this fairness rule is the following:
b1x1
b1min(q1, D)
=
b2x2
b2min(q2, D)
. (4.9)
Unlike in the previous two strategies there is always an allocation that satisfies
equation (4.9). On the other hand, the denominators of equation (4.9) depend
on the relation between qi andD. Accordingly, the PPS has four different pairs
of roots (see Table 4.1).
4.4.2 Loss-based approach
Similar to the gain-based approach, we again distinguish three fairness strate-
gies for the loss-based approach. The equal costs strategy (ECS) ensures that
the residual costs of by-product leftovers are equal for both suppliers with the
following fairness rule:
a1   b1x1 = a2   b2x2. (4.10)
Table 4.2 presents the roots of equation (4.10). It is important that equal
costs cannot be assured when the minimum cost of one supplier is more than
the maximum cost of the other supplier.
The equal marginal costs strategy (MCS) applies the Nash standard of com-
parison similar to the MPS. Consequently, the MCS applies the following fair-
ness rule:
✏b1
a1   b1x1 =
✏b2
a2   b2x2 , (4.11)
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Strt. x⇤1 x⇤2 Feasible range
ECS a1+b2D a2b1+b2 ;
a2+b1D a1
b1+b2
q1   a1 a2+b2Db1+b2
q2   a2 a1+b1Db1+b2
MCS 12 ⇤ (a1b1 +D  
a2
b2
); 12 ⇤ (a2b2 +D  
a1
b1
)
q1   a1b2 a2b1+b1b2D2b1b2
q2   a2b1 a1b2+b1b2D2b1b2
PCS
b1q1(a2 b2D)+a1b2(D q2)
b2(a1 b1(q1+q2))+a2b1
a2b1(D q1)+b2q2(a1 b1D)
b2(a1 b1(q1+q2))+a2b1 q1 < D; q2 < D
b1q1(a2 b2D)
b2(a1 b1(D+q1))+a2b1
a2b1(q1 D)+b2D(b1D a1)
b2(b1(D+q1) a1) a2b1 q1 < D; q2   D
(a2 b2D)Db1
a2b1+(a1 2b1D)b2
b2(a1 Db1)D
a2b1+(a1 2Db1)b2 q1   D; q2   D
a2b1D+b2(a1(D q2) b1D2)
a2b1+b2(a1 b1(D+q2))
b2q2(a1 b1D)
a2b1+b2(a1 b1(D+q2) q1   D; q2 < D
Table 4.2: By-product allocation and feasibility of fairness strategies with loss-
based approach
leading to the roots presented in Table 4.2. The MCS is infeasible when maxi-
mummarginal gain of one supplier is less than the minimummarginal loss of
the other supplier.
Finally, the proportional costs strategy (PCS) ensures that the ratio of the ac-
tual residual cost and the potential minimum cost of both suppliers are equal.
This equilibrium of the proportions is formulated with the following fairness
rule:
a1   b1x1
a1   b1min(q1, D) =
a2   b2x2
a2   b2min(q2, D) . (4.12)
Like the PPS, the PCS always has feasible allocations presented in Table 4.2,
again leading to four possible pairs of roots, depending on the relation be-
tween qi and D .
4.4.3 Price of Fairness
The consideration of resilience and fairness leads to an efficiency loss, which is
the price of fairness. More specifically, the overall efficiency of the industrial
symbiosis network decreases when the less efficient supplier has a nonzero
demand allocation while the more efficient supplier is not completely utilized.
PROPOSITION 8. Concurrent by-product reuse in industrial symbiosis networks is
subject to a price of fairness when x2 > 0 while x1 < q1. The price of fairness is the
efficiency loss in the system, which can be quantified with the expressions in Table 4.3.
The determination of the price of fairness is based on 1   P (x1,x2)P⇤(x1,x2) and
C(x1,x2)
C⇤(x1,x2)   1 for gain- and loss-based fairness strategies, respectively. Note
that the price of fairness has a different expression depending on q1 < D or
q1   D.
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POFprofit(x1, x2) POFcost(x1, x2)
q1 < D 1  b1x1+b2x2b1q1+b2(D q1) a1+a2 b1x1 b2x2a1+a2 b1q1 b2(D q1)   1
q1   D 1  b1x1+b2x2b1D a1+a2 b1x1 b2x2a1+a2 b1D   1
Table 4.3: The price of fairness of gain-based and loss-based fairness strategies.
The price of fairness is further specified by replacing the roots presented
in Table 4.1 and 4.2 into the price of fairness equations in Table 4.3. The gen-
eral price of fairness equations displayed in Table 4.3 already depend on q1.
Consequently, the applicable ranges of the roots identified previously define
further segments of the price of fairness functions.
PROPOSITION 9. The price of fairness of strategies with gain-based approach is a
composite function. Its segment domains are determined by the relationship between
supply (q1, q2) and demand (D), as well as the feasibility constraints of the strategies.
For the different strategies, the price of fairness is given in equation (4.13)-(4.15).
PROPOSITION 10. The price of fairness of strategies with loss-based approach is com-
posite function. Its segment domains are determined by the relationship between sup-
ply (q1, q2) and demand (D), as well as the feasibility constraints of the strategies. For
the different strategies, the price of fairness is given in equation (4.16)-(4.18).
4.5 Numerical analysis of fairness strategies
In this section, we analyze the different fairness strategies listed in Figure 4.2,
elaborating on the by-product allocations and the resulting price of fairness
for different parameter scenarios. We first consider the gain-based strategies
(EPS, MPS and PPS), followed by the loss-based strategies (ECS, MCS and
PCS). To help generalization of the results, we use the supply proportions r1
and r2 as well as the total by-product surplus ( ) in the analysis instead of the
absolute values (note that r2 = 1   r1). We also analyze the sensitivity of the
price of fairness to changes in the suppliers’ operational efficiency (b1, b2) and
disposal cost parameters (!1, !2).
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POF ⇤EPS =
8<: 1 
2b1b2D
(b1 + b2)(b1q1 + b2(D   q1)) if
b2D
b1 + b2
 q1 < D, q2   b1Db1 + b2 ,
1  2b2b1 + b2 if q1   D, q2  
b1D
b1 + b2
.
(4.13)
POF ⇤MPS =
8><>:
1  0.5(b1 + b2)D
b1q1 + b2(D   q1) if
D
2  q1 < D, q2   D2 ,
1
2  
b2
2b1
if q1   D, q2   D2 .
(4.14)
POF ⇤PPS =
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
q1(b1   b2)(q1 + q2  D)
(q1 + q2)(b2D + b1q1   b2q1) if q1, q2 < D,
q21(b1   b2)
(q1 +D)(b2D + b1q1   b2q1) if q1 < D, q2   D,
1
2  
b2
2b1
if q1, q2   D.
q2(b1   b2)
b1(q2 +D)
if q1   D, q2 < D,
(4.15)
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POF ⇤ECS =
8><>:
2a2b1 + b2(2a1   2b1D)
(b1 + b2)(a1 + a2   b2D   b1q1 + b2q2)   1 if
a1   a2 + b2D
b1 + b2
 q1 < D, q2   a2   a1 + b1Db1 + b2
2a1b2 + b1(2a2   2b2D)
(b1 + b2)(a1 + a2   b1D)   1 if q1   D, q2  
a2   a1 + b1D
b1 + b2
.
(4.16)
POF ⇤MCS =
8><>:
(b1 + b2)(a1b2 + a2b1  Db1b2)
2b1b2(a1 + a2  Db2   b1q1 + b2q1)   1 if
a1b2   a2b1 + b1b2D
2b1b2
 q1 < D, q2   a2b1   a1b2 + b1b2D2b1b2 ,
(b1 + b2)(a1b2 + a2b1  Db1b2)
2b1b2(a1 + a2  Db1)   1 if q1   D, q2  
a2b1   a1b2 + b1b2D
2b1b2
.
(4.17)
POF ⇤PCS =
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
b2(b1   b2)(a1   b1q1)(q1  D + q2)
(a1b2 + a2b1   b1b2q1   b1b2q2)(a1 + a2   b2D   b1q1 + b2q1) if q1, q2 < D,
b2q1(b1   b2)(a1   b1q1)
(a1b2 + a2b1   b1b2q1   b1b2D)(a1 + a2   b2D   b1q1 + b2q1) if q1 < D, q2 > D,
b2D(b1   b2)(a1  Db1)
(a1b2 + a2b1   2b1b2D)(a1 + a2   b1D) if q1, q2 > D,
b2q2(b1   b2)(a1   b1D)
(a1 + a2   b1D)(a1b2 + a2b1   b1b2D   b1b2q2) if q1 > D, q2 < D.
(4.18)
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Figure 4.3: By-product allocation x1 and the corresponding price of fairness
with gain-based approach in relation to the proportion of supplier 1 r1. (b2 =
1, b1 = 1.2).
4.5.1 Price of fairness of gain-based strategies
Figures 4.3 (a,b) depict by-product allocations to supplier 1 (x1) as a function
of its supply proportion (r1) for the gain-based fairness strategies. The figures
present two surplus scenarios (  = 0.2 and   = 1.2), while the difference
between the operational efficiency of the synergies is 20% (b1 = 1.2, b2 = 1).
Generally speaking, the potential maximumprofit of the suppliers increases
with their supply proportion. Accordingly, the allocation to supplier 1 (x1)
based on the PPS is increasing with the proportion of supplier 1 (Figure 4.3
(a)). Nevertheless, no additional profit is gained for the supply that exceeds
the demand. Consequently, when q1, q2   D, the PPS allocates a constant
amount of half of the by-product demand to both suppliers (Figure 4.3 (b)).
When q1   D and q2 < D, the allocation is increasing because the potential
profit of supplier 2 becomes increasingly insignificant.
Contrary to the PPS, the other two strategies have limited feasibility and
their allocation is constant (Figure 4.3 (a-b)). The MPS allocates half of the
demand to both suppliers, which is only feasible while q1, q2   D/2. On
the other hand, the EPS slightly compensates the disadvantage of supplier 2.
Therefore, the EPS generally allocates a bit more demand to supplier 2 than
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Figure 4.4: Minimum price ranges of gain-based fairness strategies as a func-
tion of by-product supply and demand. (b1 = 1.2, b2 = 1)
the MPS.
For a given supplier proportion, the distance between x1 and min(q1, D)
in Figures 4.3 (a-b) leads to the price of fairness shown in Figures 4.3 (c-d).
Consequently, the price of fairness for the PPS is increasing in r1 as long as
q1 < D. Even though the allocation to supplier 1 is increasing with the r1 in
this range, the price of fairness is also increasing because the potential maxi-
mum profit of supplier 1 is increasing. On the other hand, when q1   D, the
profit of supplier 1 is maximized and the price of fairness remains constant as
long as q2   D (Figure 4.3 (d)). Note that this plateau also corresponds to a
constant allocation (Figure 4.3 (b)). Finally, when q1   D and q2 < D, the price
of fairness resulting from the PPS starts to decrease.
The price of fairness resulting from the EPS and MPS is also increasing in
r1 as long as q1 < D, and culminates in a plateau when q1   D. Here, the
price of fairness also stays constant after q2 < D.
4.5.2 Price of fairness of loss-based strategies
Our analysis of loss-based fairness strategies follows a structure similar to that
of the previous section. Figures 4.5(a,b) depict by-product allocations to sup-
plier 1 (x1) as a function of r1. The figures again presents two surplus scenarios
(  = 0.2 and   = 1.2), an efficiency difference between the suppliers of 20%
(b1 = 1.2, b2 = 1), and disposal cost factor parameters of (!1 = !2 = 2).
Generally, as the supply proportion of a supplier increases, its potential
disposal costs increase, while the potential disposal cost for the other sup-
plier decrease. Additionally, proportional costs are subject to the potential
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Figure 4.5: By-product allocation (x1) and the resulting price of fairness with
loss-based approach in relation to the proportion of supplier 1 (r1). b1 = 1.2,
b2 = 1, !1 = !2 = 2.
minimum costs of the suppliers, meaning that as the proportion of supplier
1 increases while q1 < D, the potential minimum cost of supplier 1 increases
with q1 resulting in an increasing allocation (x1) (Figure 4.5 (a)). After q1 > D
the potential minimum cost of supplier 1 becomes subject to D while its dis-
posal costs are still increasing resulting in a decreasing allocation (Figure 4.5
(b)). Nevertheless, when supplier 2 becomes relatively small, which implies
q1 > D and q2 < D, the cost of supplier 2 becomes insignificant and the de-
mand allocation to supplier 1 is again increasing (Figures 4.5 (a-b)).
The ECS and MCS also follow the disposal cost of the suppliers and ac-
cordingly allocate monotonously increasing demand to supplier 1 (Figure 4.5
(a-b)). The efficiency difference between the synergies plays a role in case of
the MCS, leading to slightly different feasibility limitations than in case of the
ECS. Also, the MCS favors supplier 1 less than the ECS for a given supplier
proportion.
The price of fairness corresponding to these scenarios is shown in Figures
4.5 (c-d). Again, the distance between x1 and min(q1, D) represents the price
of fairness. Consequently, while q1 < D, the price of fairness for the ECS and
MCS is decreasing as the proportion of supplier 1 increases. Here, the price of
fairness goes all the way down to zero while the allocation curves are getting
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Figure 4.6: Minimum price ranges of loss-based fairness strategies in relation
to by-product supply and demand. (b1 = 1.2, b2 = 1,!1 = !2 = 2)
closer to min(q1, D). In contrast, the price of fairness of the PCS is increasing
in this domain. After q1   D, the price of fairness for the ECS and MCS is
further decreasing and the curves also become steeper due to the fact that the
demand now limits the minimum cost of supplier 1 (Figure 4.5 (d)). In case of
the PCS, the price of fairness further increases with the proportion of supplier
1 until the proportion of supplier 2 becomes insignificant. Consequently, the
price of fairness peaks and then decreases for further increase in r1 (Figures
4.5 (c-d)).
Figures 4.5(c-d) shows significant differences in the price of fairness be-
tween the PCS and the other two strategies. The MCS always has a higher
price of fairness than the ECS. However, the feasible domain of the MCS also
covers some larger proportions of supplier 1, meaning that the MCS has the
lowest price of fairness in cases where the ECS is infeasible.
Figure 4.6 shows a comprehensive picture of theminimumprice of fairness
for any given supply combination. We can again ignore the range where q1 +
q2  D. As seen in Figure 4.5 (c-d), the feasibility range for ECS and MCS is
limited, but they still lead to the lowest price of fairness for a reasonable range
of supply proportions. In fact, the equal marginal costs strategy is likely to
dominate the proportional costs strategy where the more efficient supplier has
a slightly larger proportion of the total supply. Nevertheless, equal residual
costs always results in a lower price of fairness than equal marginal costs. In a
small range of supply proportions where q2 is slightly larger than q1, the PCS
leads to a lower price of fairness. For the remainder of the figure, only PCS is
feasible, and inherently leads to the lowest price of fairness.
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Figure 4.7: Sensitivity of the price of fairness in case of gain-based strategies
(EPS, MPS and PPS from left to right) to differences in operational efficiency
of the suppliers (b2 = 1, b1 is increasing)
4.5.3 Sensitivity analysis
In this section, we analyze the sensitivity of the price of fairness to differences
in the operational efficiency and disposal cost parameters. Figure 4.7 depicts
the sensitivity of gain-based fairness strategies for increasing efficiency differ-
ences  b between the synergies. Here, b1 is increasing while b2 = 1. Figure
4.7 shows that increasing efficiency differences lead to an increasing price of
fairness for all of the gain-based strategies. Furthermore, the price of fairness
resulting from the EPS shows a stronger increase, since the allocation resulting
from the EPS also changes with the efficiency difference.
In case of theMPS and PPS, allocation is independent from efficiency. Gen-
erally, increments in the price of fairness are proportional with the increments
in the efficiency difference. This also means that the same b1/b2 ratio results
in the same price of fairness. Finally, it is important to note that changes in
efficiency do not influence the results presented in Figure 4.4.
Figure 4.8 depicts the sensitivity of loss-based fairness strategies to differ-
ences in efficiency bi (first row) and differences in disposal cost !i (second
row). For the differences in efficiency, the disposal costs are held constant at
!1 = !2 = 2. In other words, the increasing efficiency means that supplier
1 recovers increasingly more of its initial by-product disposal cost. Conse-
quently, the price of fairness resulting from the ECS and MCS is increasing as
 b increases (Figures 4.8 (a-b)). At the same time, the curves become steeper.
Furthermore, while b increases, the feasible range of the ECS andMCS shifts
towards larger proportions of supplier 1, decreasing the overlap between the
ECS and MCS. Note that, accordingly, the situation of minimum price strate-
gies in Figure 4.6 would change; the range in which MCS leads to the lowest
price of fairness would get larger.
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Figure 4.8: Sensitivity of the price of fairness in case of loss-based strategies
(ECS, MCS and PCS from left to right) to changes in: to differences in oper-
ational efficiency of the suppliers (b2 = 1, b1 is increasing) - first row ; and
disposal cost factor (b2 = 1, b1 = 1.7) - second row.
The price of fairness resulting from the PCS (Figure 4.8 (c)) is also increas-
ing with  b due to the generally increasing efficiency trade-off. However, the
proportional strategy also takes into account the potential minimum cost of
supplier 1. Therefore, when  b, thus b1, is relatively high and q1 is relatively
low the price of fairness increases with a slower rate. Furthermore, as q1 is in-
creasing and  b is decreasing this effect becomes insignificant relative to the
efficiency trade-off.
Figure 4.8 (d-f) show the sensitivity results for the disposal cost. In gen-
eral, when the disposal cost factor increases (!i), while the operational costs
( i) remain unchanged, the actual cost saving resulting from by-product reuse
increases. In other words, operational efficiency (bi) increases. Note that this
is also true with gain-based approach. Furthermore, if !1 increases, supplier
1 faces greater disposal costs and the price of fairness in the system also in-
creases because a larger saving is sacrificed on behalf of the less efficient sup-
plier. On the other hand, when !2 increases, the price of fairness decreases
because the efficiency of supplier 2 improves. Furthermore, when !1 and !2
increase to the same extent, the relative difference between the operational ef-
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Fairness strategy
Gain-based Loss-based
Type of information EPS MPS PPS ECS MCS PCS
Demand X X X X X X
Supply X X X X
Efficiency and costs X X X X
Table 4.4: Information requirements of gain-based and loss-based fairness
strategies
ficiencies of the suppliers decreases. Consequently, the price of fairness in the
system decreases.
4.6 Discussion
In this section, we elaborate on the impact of the results presented in the pre-
vious section. We analyze the allocation strategies and their results from the
perspective of the individual companies involved, as well as the perspective of
a possible matchmaking broker. Such a brokerage function can be performed
by the organizational unit that is often present in industrial symbiosis initia-
tives.
First of all, any kind of allocation strategy requires certain information
about the suppliers. Arguably, a matchmaking broker might have difficulties
obtaining information about operational efficiencies and cost structures. Fur-
thermore, assessing efficiencies and calculating disposal costs is not always
an option for the broker. Considering the nature of industrial symbiosis ini-
tiatives, in which a certain level of trust and willingness to collaborate can
assumed to be present, information sharing barriers might not be as difficult
to overcome as in regular supply chain relationships. Nevertheless, our re-
sults give insights in the information requirements of the different approaches,
which could be decisive in the selection of a fairness strategy.
COROLLARY 1. In by-product reuse in industrial symbiosis networks, fairness strate-
gies have different information requirements with regards to determining fair alloca-
tions. The information requirements are shown in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4 shows that the equal marginal and proportional profits strategies
only require information on supply and demand quantities, even though they
achieve a relatively low price of fairness in many situations. On the other
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hand, the loss-based strategies also require information about the cost struc-
tures and the efficiencies of the suppliers.
During matchmaking, a broker can take the price of fairness resulting from
an allocation into account, and assess whether it is worth sacrificing this effi-
ciency to increase involvement in the industrial symbiosis and increase sup-
ply chain resilience in the synergy system. While keeping overall efficiency
in perspective, economic engagement of the suppliers is the goal of the bro-
ker. In the long-term, however, the resilience would also be of interest for the
individual suppliers.
Over time, reallocation might be required, since by-product supply and
demand, and also cost and efficiency parameters can change. The different al-
location strategies then lead to different reallocation, leading to specific incen-
tives for the suppliers involved in the industrial symbiosis network in terms
of adjusting their supply quantity, improving their efficiencies, or reducing
some cost factors.
Taking a gain-based approach, a supplier might opt to increase available
supply to leverage more profit from the synergy. In this case, the proportional
profits strategy results in increasing allocation and profit for that supplier, at
the expense of the other supplier. In other words, ramping supply up to a
certain level pays off by employing this strategy. This feedback effect could
induce competitive behavior between the suppliers. However, no additional
allocation is granted when the available supply exceeds the demand. Note
that allocation resulting from the other two strategies is not affected by in-
creasing available supply.
COROLLARY 2. The proportional profits strategy increases allocation and profit for
a supplier that increases its supply, thereby decreasing allocation and profit for the
other supplier. As such, this strategy has the largest incentive to increase by-product
quantities.
Following a loss-based approach, a supplier can opt to reduce its supply to
lessen residual costs. Generally, when the equal or equal marginal costs strat-
egy is employed, the overall industrial symbiosis network is better off if the
less efficient supplier’s supply is reduced. When the more efficient supplier’s
supply is reduced, then the proportional costs strategy results in a greater total
cost reduction. The equal costs strategy yields equal cost reduction for both
suppliers, but the equal marginal costs strategy always yields greater cost re-
duction for the more efficient supplier. The proportional costs strategy yields
greater cost reduction for the supplier that reduces supply; moreover, if the
supplier’s supply exceeds the demand then this strategy adds extra costs to
the other supplier.
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COROLLARY 3. The equal (and equal marginal) costs strategy splits cost savings
resulting from reduced by-product surplus equally (nearly equally) between the sup-
pliers. On the contrary, the proportional costs strategy keeps the cost savings for the
supplier who reduced its supply, leading to a large incentive to reduce its by-product
quantity.
Improving efficiency — for example, by advancing technology — also af-
fects profits and residual costs. The equal profits (costs) strategy shares the ex-
tra profit (cost savings) equally between the suppliers. Moreover, improving
the economically less efficient supplier, or the supplier that has more available
supply, yields greater collective profits or cost savings. Consequently, sharing
technological advantage has a positive effect on the overall industrial symbio-
sis networkwhen “equal” strategies employed. Note that allocations resulting
from the equal marginal and proportional profits strategies are independent
from efficiency. Thus, these strategies do not promote the sharing of techno-
logical advantage; they do however reward technological improvements for
the individual suppliers. For the equal marginal costs strategy, residual costs
increase for the supplier that improves efficiency, while assuring cost savings
for the other supplier. Intuitively, this strategy therefore gives no incentives
for technological improvements, instead requiring altruistic behavior. Finally,
the proportional costs strategy assures most of the extra cost savings go to the
supplier that made the efficiency improvement; moreover, this strategy adds
extra costs to the other supplier if the available supply exceeds demand for
any of the suppliers.
COROLLARY 4. The equal profits and costs strategies promote sharing technological
advantage by splitting the resulting extra benefits equally between the suppliers.
Finally, a reason for reallocation could be an increase in by-product de-
mand. Generally, this has a positive effect on the industrial symbiosis net-
work and the extra demand is “fairly” allocated to the suppliers. By doing so,
in case of proportional strategies, demand increase yields significantly greater
extra profit or cost savings for the supplier with more supply.
Concurrent by-product reuse in industrial symbiosis networks is not al-
ways economically justified, especially when one relatively efficient supplier
could cover all by-product demand. On the other hand, involving other sup-
pliers in the network has benefits besides the previously discussed introduc-
tion of resilience. Actions that increase gains or reduce losses across the in-
dustrial symbiosis network improve the long-term financial and technological
capabilities of companies in the regional industrial ecosystem. In this respect,
fairness strategies result in more balanced benefits.
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Fairness strategy
Gain-based Loss-based
Type of action EPS MPS PPS ECS MCS PCS
Increase/decrease supply — — I C C I
Improve efficiency C I I C A I
Increase demand C C I C C I
Table 4.5: Characteristics of fairness strategies in terms of engaging companies
in actions. C: collaborative, I: individualistic, A: altruistic, —: no effect.
COROLLARY 5. In by-product synergy systems, fairness strategies engage compa-
nies either in collaborative, individualistic, or altruistic behavior. Table 4.5 summa-
rizes these different behaviors for changing supply, demand, and efficiencies.
Choosing the most suitable fairness strategy in regional ecosystems is an
important initial effort of a matchmaking broker or a central organizational
unit in an industrial symbiosis network. This effort may not only consider the
price of fairness, but also consider how the employed strategy affects long-
term collaboration issues such as sharing technological advantages, reducing
by-product surplus, or increasing demand in the industrial ecosystem.
4.7 Conclusion and future work
Companies involved in by-product reuse in industrial symbiosis networks
leverage a rawmaterial substitute and avoid disposal costs generating system-
wide competitive advantages. However, by-product synergies are normally
subordinate to primary production operations. Consequently, a matchmaker
brokering by-product reuse transactions can combine multiple, concurrent
suppliers and/or buyers if that helps match by-product supply and demand
and creates supply chain resilience. Furthermore, symbiotic relationships build
on collective economic incentives, therefore, the assurance of fair but not nec-
essarily equal benefits is one of the key challenges in resource allocation in
industrial symbiosis networks.
In this paper, we developed a framework for concurrent by-product reuse
in industrial symbiosis networks. We proposed fairness approaches to allo-
cate demand to by-product suppliers in order to ensure collective economic
benefits for the participating companies. Based on the literature, we identified
three gain-based and three loss-based fairness strategies that we associated
with the profits and costs that emerge in by-product synergies.
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We derived the price of fairness resulting from the different “fair” alloca-
tions. Furthermore, we showed how the price of fairness changes in relation to
the treatment costs and disposal costs of by-products, as well as to differences
in the available by-product supply quantities. We found that strategies based
on equal and equal marginal profits and costs generally motivate collabora-
tion, such as reducing by-product surplus and sharing technological improve-
ments within the industrial symbiosis network. On the other hand, strategies
based on proportionality are found to reward individualistic behavior.
We also found that fairness strategies based on gain-based approaches re-
quire less information sharing compared with strategies based on loss-based
approaches. Some of the gain-based strategies can however still lead to a rel-
atively low price of fairness, while not requiring detailed information on cost
structures. On the other hand, employing loss-based fairness strategies al-
ways requires information about by-product quantities and cost structures.
The results have clear managerial implications for companies involved in
initiating or operating industrial symbiosis networks, as well as for match-
making brokers and central organizational units in such networks. Since bro-
kers normally aim to efficiently allocate by-product supply and demand, and
create effective, resilient collaborative industrial networks, our results also
contribute to regional ecosystem development.
Similar to situationswith concurrent suppliers, concurrent by-product users
would also increase resilience in industrial symbiosis. When there is limited
by-product supply and more than one by-product user with excess demand,
fairness strategies could also be relevant for allocation. In fact, an industrial
symbiosis network of one supplier and two buyers would leverage the cost
savings of avoiding raw material procurement, while still facing residual pro-
curement costs due to a possible by-product shortage. Consequently, the gain-
and loss-based approaches and the profit and cost structures of this paper will
be applicable in a one supplier two buyers setup. This strengthens the gen-
erality of our results regarding the price of fairness in concurrent by-product
synergy systems.
One of the limitations of our study is the basic industrial symbiosis net-
work structure. When more suppliers would be involved, allocation would
be more complex. However, the fairness strategies introduced in this paper
would still be relevant. Intuitively, increasing the number of suppliers with
low efficiencies would increase the price of fairness. Furthermore, the infor-
mation requirements and the engagement incentives of the strategies we iden-
tified would still hold in larger systems.
Another limitation is that the price of fairness is only based on the disposal
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costs and the operational efficiency. Even though our definition of operational
efficiency can cover many differences between the suppliers, we did not in-
clude the potential increase in transaction costs resulting from managing an
increased supplier base. Nevertheless, since industrial symbiosis builds on
trust and information sharing in long-term relationships, transaction costs are
arguably reduced to a minimum.
Based on the above-mentioned limitations, a future extension of this work
would be to further elaborate on collaborative allocations and analyze the
price of fairness in situations with more than two by-product suppliers or
more than one user. Furthermore, since resource efficiency and environmental
considerations are key drivers of industrial symbiosis initiatives, another rel-
evant topic for further study would be the environmental impacts of different
fairness strategies.
Another limitation is that the price of fairness is only based on the disposal
costs and the operational efficiency. Even though our definition of operational
efficiency can cover many differences between the suppliers, we did not in-
clude the potential increase in transaction costs resulting from managing an
increased supplier base. Nevertheless, since industrial symbiosis builds on
trust and information sharing in long-term relationships, transaction costs are
arguably reduced to a minimum.
Based on the above-mentioned limitations, a future extension of this work
would be to further elaborate on collaborative allocations and analyze the
price of fairness in situations with more than two by-product suppliers or
more than one user. Furthermore, since resource efficiency and environmental
considerations are key drivers of industrial symbiosis initiatives, another rel-
evant topic for further study would be the environmental impacts of different
fairness strategies.

CHAPTER 5
Conclusions
This thesis makes a contribution to research in sustainable supply chain man-
agement by elaborating on the industrial symbiosis phenomenon. Industrial
symbiosis networks are a collaborative effort to sustainability and are a form
of closed-loop supply chains. Industrial symbiosis is characterized by a sup-
ply chain reconfiguration that connects undesired production outputs to ma-
terial intake resulting in new material flows while eliminating others. The
resulting network of relationships emphasizes synergistic relations, commu-
nity, and collaboration within geographical proximity. Industrial symbiosis
contributes to regional sustainable development efforts, involving competi-
tiveness and an efficient use of natural resources.
There is ample research on industrial symbiosis, but not from an opera-
tions and supply chain management perspective, even though many related
challenges can be identified. This thesis takes this perspective and acquires
new knowledge through focusing on its key characteristics. The thesis thereby
grounds industrial symbiosis in operations and supply chain management
theory, and it provides a basis for the improved organization and operation
of industrial symbiosis networks.
5.1 Summary of findings
The key characteristics of industrial symbiosis networks are reflected in the
collaborative effort of the participants to sustainability and in the competitive
advantages that synergistic relations offer. This thesis elaborates on both of
these characteristics; furthermore, it connects them by focusing on the trade-
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off between collaborative effort and individual economic interests. Conse-
quently, three pairs of research questions are answered. The first pair of ques-
tions deal with the collaborative effort to sustainability in industrial symbiosis
networks:
RQ1a — How do companies in industrial symbiosis pursue the triple
bottom line of sustainability?
RQ1b — What are the supply chain collaboration challenges that affect
the sustainability performance of industrial symbiosis networks?
In general, the triple bottom line of sustainability refers to profit, planet,
and people related performance. Furthermore, concerning these drivers, or-
ganizational, governmental, and community stakeholders of the companies
create pressure and incentives to improve performance. As a result, collabo-
rative effort manifests in geographical proximity in a form of industrial sym-
biosis. Chapter 2 of this thesis looks at fifteen industrial symbiosis networks
reported on by case studies published in academic journals.
By looking at examples worldwide, it is clear that industrial symbiosis
means business concerning profitability. In a synergistic transaction, includ-
ing a supplier and a buyer, it is necessary that both parties reduce costs or
gain extra revenue as opposed to a system without that synergy. However,
synergies do not come into existence or come to an end if in the long-term its
associated costs offset its benefits, or a better alternative arises.
Furthermore, from the case studies it turns out that industrial symbiosis is
typically driven by regulatory and financial instruments that emphasize envi-
ronmental performance. In fact, emission regulations andwaste disposal costs
were found as the main reason for initiating synergistic transactions. Indeed,
industrial symbiosis simultaneously avoids disposal and reduces part of the
upstream supply chain activities associated with the production of raw mate-
rials. However, companies that constitute supply and demand for wastes and
by-products may still rely on unsustainable technologies and/or toxic materi-
als undermining the sustainability effort in industrial symbiosis networks. In
fact, many industrial symbiosis examples include power plants burning coal
and refineries processing oil and natural gas.
Finally, from the case studies it turns out that companies in industrial sym-
biosis integrate the perspectives of community stakeholders into their envi-
ronmental strategy. Furthermore, industrial symbiosis often entails new oper-
ations that create employment opportunities.
In terms of the collaborative effort to sustainability, industrial symbiosis
networks face challenges attributed to supply chain integration and coordi-
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nation. Chapter 2 identifies specific challenges concerning organizational and
operational aspects of collaboration. As far as sustainability performance is
concerned, synergies have to emphasize non-hazardous material flows be-
tween environmentally sustainable processes. Furthermore, mutual economic
incentives need to be sustained for long-term cooperation by coordinating
cost, benefit, and risk sharing in the network. From the case studies it turns
out that often a dedicated organizational unit takes care of the tasks related to
coordination. However, establishing an organizational unit is a challenge. It
requires a communication platform that integrates local industrial communi-
ties and authorities. Additionally, members of the organizational unit have to
engage a diverse set of stakeholders in social networking and in local problem
solving, and effectively coordinate transactions.
From an operational perspective, industrial symbiosis networks often re-
quire dedicated infrastructure, such as a pipeline network that transports steam,
or transportation devices and warehouse facilities that collect, store, and de-
liver wastes and by-products. An efficient infrastructure increases the geo-
graphical range of industrial symbiosis networks by making potential syn-
ergies at larger distances economically feasible. However, implementing such
system needs investment; furthermore, integrating by-product treatment, stor-
age, and reuse into operations is difficult when companies prioritize their core
operations.
Once industrial symbiosis is operational, it leads to additional challenges.
In fact, it is likely to have mismatch between by-product supply and demand
because the market mechanisms that generate them are usually independent.
Furthermore, because by-products are side effects of production their quality
and quaintly bear uncertainty, which can negatively affect industrial symbio-
sis. This leads coordination challenges. Consequently, it is likely that original
and by-product materials need to be combined in procurement and produc-
tion planning decisions. Furthermore, matching by-product supply and de-
mand, and also securing continuous and stable quality and quantity may only
be ensured on a broader market, involving more parties. However, these chal-
lenges come with additional transaction and operational costs, and increase
the complexity of coordination.
In addition to the physical infrastructure, an informational infrastructure
that provides aggregated and temporal data on material flows contributes to
industrial symbiosis networks. Nevertheless, the required data is not always
available, and companies can be reluctant to share production-related infor-
mation.
After identifying challenges related to collaboration, the thesis elaborates
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on the other key characteristic of industrial symbiosis networks. The second
pair of research questions focus on competitiveness in industrial symbiosis:
RQ2a — What are the key capabilities and resources that firms partici-
pating in industrial symbiosis rely on?
RQ2b—How is competitive advantage in industrial symbiosis networks
obtained based on these capabilities and resources?
Chapter 3 of this thesis grounds industrial symbiosis in the theory of com-
petitiveness. The thesis analyzes eight industrial symbiosis networks using
the resource-based view of competitive advantage. More specifically, the view
includes the natural-resource-based view of the firm, the relational view of
inter-organizational cooperations, and the contingent resource-based view of
proactive corporate environmental strategy. Accordingly, three dimensions of
organizational capabilities and resources are identified.
On the first dimension, the proactive environmental stance of individual
firms was found to be essential. In fact, firms need to be aware of inputs and
outputs of other industries to recognize symbiosis opportunities. Based on the
case studies, it was concluded that firms also draw on dynamic organizational
capabilities that allow supply chain reconfiguration and integration, as well as
on life cycle thinking and proactive stakeholder management. Furthermore,
it was concluded that stable, continuous and reliable by-product supply and
demand are the central resources in industrial symbiosis.
On the relational dimension, industrial symbiosis entails strategic alliances
and network embeddedness. It was found that firms draw on experience in
complementary strategic alliances and in the efficient management of inter-
dependencies, as well as on symbiosis-specific knowledge transfer routines.
Furthermore, firms in industrial symbiosis networks leverage familiarity and
emphasize collective problems embedded in their community. However, in
cases where stakeholder involvement or network embeddedness was lacking
the development of industrial symbiosis was hindered.
On the dimension of contingencies, the general business environment, in-
cluding institutionalization and an organizational unit, was identified as a
vital part of industrial symbiosis networks. In fact, institutionalization and
the organizational unit were found closely related. In the analyzed industrial
symbiosis cases, institutionalization created a business context that supported
industrial symbiosis with regulatory and financial instruments. However, ob-
structive legislation halted practical implementation. Furthermore, the orga-
nizational unit reduced uncertainty and complexity concerning businesses by
providing symbiosis-specific information, mechanisms that ensure collective
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benefits, and by effectively coordinating transactions.
As far as competitiveness is concerned, sustained competitive advantage
in industrial symbiosis networks is attributed to two general conditions. First,
industrial symbiosis creates value by increasing productivity, reducing costs,
generating revenue, and/ormitigating risk attributed to natural resource scarci-
ties based on idiosyncratic supply chain relations. Second, industrial symbio-
sis is difficult to imitate due to a combination of capabilities and resources that
feed into operations and supply chain management.
Acknowledging the fact that industrial symbiosis networks develop grad-
ually, the thesis illustrates how competitive advantage is obtained through-
out the initiation and progression of networks. It argues that firms that sys-
tematically aim to turn undesired production outputs into a resource and in-
vest in learning about material flows in their surroundings obtain advantage
in initiating industrial symbiosis. Additionally, in a business environment
that supports the reuse of by-products with financial and regulatory instru-
ments, and where transparency and institutionalized forms communication
and cooperation are present, firms are more likely to initiate industrial sym-
biosis. However, synergistic transactions based on high-quality by-products
and with matching supply and demand are more competitive. Furthermore,
firms that posses the necessary financial resources and managerial capabili-
ties to reconfigure their supply chain and to engage other firms in industrial
symbiosis obtain competitive advantage.
The progression of industrial symbiosis involves an increased emphasis on
sustainability, on diversity in terms of materials and firms involved, and on
supply chain resilience concerning redundancy; however, it implies increas-
ing network complexity. It is suggested that firms that secure their exclusive
access to by-product supply or demand, as well as increase the proportion
of synergy-sensitive resources and/or operations in synergistic relations ob-
tain competitive advantage. In addition, partners that emphasize symbiosis-
specific knowledge sharing routines are more competitive because they are
more likely to find new synergistic opportunities. Furthermore, it is sug-
gested that firms have advantage in increasing the number of synergies when
they have effective coordination mechanisms in place. Based on the analyzed
cases, however, it seems that complex industrial symbiosis networks are co-
ordinated by an organizational unit. It is concluded that to facilitate progress,
the organizational unit needs a vision and performance objectives concern-
ing low impact technologies and sustainable development. Furthermore, an
organizational unit that is able to ensure collective economic incentives, and
broaden the market of by-products contributes to the competitiveness of the
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industrial symbiosis network.
Finally, the thesis elaborates on collective economic incentives in indus-
trial symbiosis networks with multiple, concurrent by-product suppliers. In
general, such redundancy is an operational strategy to increase resiliency by
improving the stability, reliability, and continuity of supply. In industrial sym-
biosis, this however leads to allocation problems, in which limited by-product
demand has to be allocated to the suppliers. Considering a collective distri-
bution of costs and benefits, the demand allocation needs to include fairness
considerations. However, fairness normally comes with a cost, which is the
trade-off for emphasizing collective gains or losses instead of an economically
optimal allocation. Chapter 4 of this thesis focuses on fair allocation strategies
in industrial symbiosis networks by answering the following pair of research
questions:
RQ3a — How can the price of fairness be measured in industrial sym-
biosis networks?
RQ3b — How do different fairness approaches influence collaboration
in industrial symbiosis networks?
Chapter 4 introduces a minimal formal model of an industrial symbiosis
network, including two suppliers and one buyer, which allows to easily de-
rive by-product allocations and the price of fairness for allocation strategies
with different fairness consideration. The analysis includes two approaches
to allocation. The gain-based approach considers the economic savings that
are made by avoiding the disposal costs. The loss-based approach, on the
contrary, considers the residual costs the suppliers face for disposing their by-
product surplus. A central assumption is that the operational cost structures
of the two suppliers are not equal. Consequently, allocating demand to the
less efficient supplier while the more efficient supplier’s supply is not fully
utilized implies a price of fairness. This price of fairness can be quantified
and depends on how fairness is defined. The thesis offers three definitions
of fair allocation that are applicable for both gain- and loss-based approaches.
The most basic option to include fairness is to ensure equal gains (losses) for
both suppliers. A second option is based on the Nash standard of comparison,
which is the percentage change in gains (losses) when it is allocated a small
additional amount of supply. This allocation ensures equal marginal gains
(losses) to the suppliers. Finally, a third option is to ensure that the propor-
tion of the actual gains (losses) and the potential maximum gains (minimum
losses) of the suppliers are equal. The thesis elaborates on the resulting six
allocation strategies in terms their price of fairness, their information sharing
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requirements, and their impact on collaborative behaviour.
After numerical analysis it is concluded that the price of fairness depends
on circumstances, including the amount of available supplies at the individ-
ual suppliers, the total surplus in the system, and the efficiency difference
between suppliers. Furthermore, the allocation strategy with the lowest price
of fairness depends on a combination of circumstances. In case of the gain-
based approaches, it was found that typically a low price is achieved when
equal by-product demands are allocated to the suppliers; however, when the
more efficient supplier has more available supplies, the proportional strategy
results in the lowest price of fairness. In case of the loss-based approaches,
the results are more subtle, but in general, the proportional strategy results in
the lowest price of fairness. However, when the suppliers have close to equal
amounts of available supplies, then the equal and equal marginal strategies
lead to a lower price of fairness.
In the thesis, it is argued that fairness should be managed by the orga-
nizational unit of the industrial symbiosis network. A central broker can
coordinate a broader by-product market that will increase resilience in the
supply-demand network. However, to ensure fairness, the broker needs in-
formation about the circumstances in the network. It is found that the infor-
mation requirements of the fairness strategies are different. In fact, the equal
marginal gains strategy only requires information about the demand quantity
because it allocates equal demand between the suppliers. The proportional
gains strategy requires additional information about the available supplies,
and the equal gains strategy also requires additional information about the
costs structures of the suppliers. In general, the loss-based fairness strate-
gies require more information, including demand quantities, supply quan-
tities, and information about the supplier’s costs structures. Consequently,
gain-based fairness is easier to implement in industrial symbiosis networks.
Furthermore, it is argued that the broker considers how fairness strategies
affect the collaborative effort or promote competitive behaviour in the net-
work. It was demonstrated that the proportional gains strategy increases al-
location and gains for the supplier that increases its available supply, thereby
decreasing the allocation and gains for the other supplier. Similarly, the pro-
portional losses strategy keeps the cost savings for the supplier that reduces
its available supplies. Consequently, strategies based on proportionality in-
troduce incentives to behave individualistically, thus promoting competition
in the network. On the contrary, the equal and marginal losses strategies split
the cost savings resulting from reduced by-product surplus nearly equally be-
tween the suppliers. Furthermore, the strategies based on equal gains and
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losses split the extra benefits resulting from efficiency improvements, thereby
encouraging the sharing of technological developments within the network.
Consequently, strategies based on equality and marginal equality introduce
incentives for joint action and knowledge sharing, thus promoting collabora-
tion. Nevertheless, ensuring collaborative incentives and keeping the addi-
tional costs of redundancy at an acceptable level remains a challenge.
5.2 Future research directions
Industrial symbiosis is an important part of the resource efficiency framework
suggested in European policy, and it is recognized as a key feature of circular
material flows in industrial systems. The European action plan for circular
economy will inevitable strongly increase the focus on the use of waste flows
as replacement of virgin resources and hence the focus in the coming years on
industrial symbiosis.
Fully circular material flows, however, are seldom observed in practice. In
fact, most of the industrial symbiosis networks worldwide are not circular;
they are part of larger industrial systems that still rely on nonrenewable re-
sources and/or generate environmental hazards. One reason for this is that
to achieve circular material flows, the design of products in terms of materi-
als used and product architecture might have to be changed. Nevertheless, in
a future where products are designed for a circular economy, it is likely that
material flows across supply chains become increasingly relevant, and thus
industrial symbiosis will be more prominent.
It is important to consider that closed-loop supply chain management op-
erates on two distinct dimensions. On the one hand, it deals with a prod-
uct flow dimension along supply chains, manifesting forward and reverse
flows of products and materials. On the other hand, it deals with material
flows across supply chains, within geographical proximity, manifesting rela-
tionships outside the core businesses of firms. This second dimension defines
a distinct area for industrial symbiosis research. However, from a manage-
rial perspective, it is important to know how far those geographical bound-
aries can be stretched. And more importantly, what the limiting conditions
for increasing the radius of material flows in industrial symbiosis networks
are. To some extent, these conditions are economic considerations and can be
overcome with efficient organization and logistics. Increasing environmental
pressure and legislation is also likely to increase the willingness to invest in
symbiotic relationships and thus extend the geographical boundaries. How-
ever, there might be a spatial limit outside of which community ties are not
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strong enough to form industrial symbiosis.
In most of the examples of industrial symbiosis networks large companies
with stable and continuous supply and demand constitute dyadic synergistic
transactions. This also leads to further research questions. Is industrial sym-
biosis only a strategy for large companies; and if not, how can small flows of
by-products be organized into a network? It could be that industrial symbiosis
manifests spontaneously and onlyworkswell in a form of dyadic transactions;
and it is likely that including small and medium-sized companies will require
an organizational unit or broker in order to match supply and demand. How-
ever, increasing the number of participants in the network increases complex-
ity and transaction costs, including the cost of coordination and risk attributed
to supply and demand uncertainty, even though it might also increase net-
work resiliency. Consequently, future research in this direction should go be-
yond dyadic relations in industrial symbiosis networks. Furthermore, moving
towards circular economy will increase the need for systematic approaches to
the optimization of supply chains in an industrial symbiosis context.
Even though examples of industrial systems operating with fully circular
material flows might de developed in the near future, it is likely that wastes
and by-products will remain secondary for companies as their priority is on
their core production. In a circular system, however, the replenishment rate
of wastes and by-products would affect the rate of production. Furthermore,
increasing or decreasing the intake or output of one production entity has an
effect and depends on the other entities because of material surplus or short-
age. Consequently, in a circular system, individual companies will become
more interdependent compared with traditional supply chains.
From a managerial point of view, it is interesting to further elaborate on
the mechanisms that affect material supply and demand and the sustainabil-
ity performance in circular economies; as part of this, an operations and sup-
ply chain management perspective on industrial symbiosis can provide useful
support. Further research can extend the theoretical basis provided in this the-
sis, and provide additional empirical and analytical foundations for resource
efficiency and circular material flows.
Empirical research is supposed to uncover and study cases of circular eco-
nomies based on synergistic relations, and for example, test the propositions
presented in this thesis. Furthermore, analytical work could be performed to
provide decision support regarding the optimal dimensions of circular eco-
nomies, including production and consumption capacities and geographical
boundaries. This type of research could also support the development to-
wards a circular economy.
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This thesis grounds industrial symbiosis in operations management and supply chain management 
theory. Specifically, the thesis elaborates on the collaborative and competitive characteristics of 
industrial symbiosis. First, it considers the supply chain integration and coordination challenges that 
appear in industrial symbiosis networks, on both organizational and operational level. Secondly, the 
thesis discusses the organizational capabilities and resources relevant for competitiveness on three 
dimensions: the level of the firm, the network, and the business environment. Finally, the thesis 
elaborates on supply chain resiliency based on a formal model applying fairness considerations to 
allocate resources between multiple concurrent suppliers. Overall, the thesis provides a basis for the 
improved organization and operation of industrial symbiosis networks.
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